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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY ON JUDICAL POLITICS AND LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES
This dissertation examines the Federalist Society, which is a network of conservative and
libertarian attorneys, judges, law professors, and law students. The organization was founded by
law students at Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and the University of Chicago Law
School in 1982, and has, over the last four decades, come to play a central role in law and politics
in the United States. Individuals affiliated with the Federalist Society influence the law through a
variety of avenues.
Federalist Society-members advance the goals of the conservative legal movement in a
variety of capacities—by writing amicus curiae briefs providing the Supreme Court with legal
arguments in favor of conservative decisions, by representing litigants in oral arguments before
the Court, by working as law clerks for Supreme Court justices, and even by serving as Supreme
Court justices themselves. In fact, six of the nine current justices of the Supreme Court are
affiliated with the Federalist Society.
Despite the Federalist Society’s vast influence on law and politics in the United States
today, little research on the network of conservative judges, attorneys, law professors, and law
students exist. This dissertation is concerned chiefly with evaluating the influence of the
Federalist Society.
Drawing from the literature on social movements, I begin by evaluating the sources of the
network’s strength in law schools around the United States. I find support for the hypotheses that
organizational strength is driven by both students (at the grassroots level) and law professors (at
the elite level). Federalist Society student chapters are stronger when the law school has more
conservative students, more efficacious students, more conservative law professors, more
efficacious law professors, and when there is a larger ideological gap between a law school’s
most conservative professors and either the law school’s average alum or the law school’s
average professor.
Turning to evaluate the behavior of Federalist Society members on the Supreme Court—
where members of the network have the most influence—I show that Federalist Society members
who are justices on the Supreme Court are especially likely to vote conservatively on certain
policy issues (e.g.; abortion, affirmative action, and campaign spending). And although they
might be expected to be more likely than their Republican-nominated peers to vote in favor of the
state’s position in cases in which one party is a state, the results suggest that Federalist Society
members prioritize conservative voting over supporting the state’s position.

In the final empirical chapter, I leverage a survey experiment in which respondents were
given vignettes about a then-upcoming Supreme Court case, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health,
and evaluate how information about the composition of the expected majority coalition influences
respondents’ support for court curbing measures. The results have important implications for
public support of the Supreme Court. Additional analyses presented in this chapter also reveal
previously unknown influence of an individual’s ideological polarization on support for broadly
targeted and narrowly targeted court curbing measures. This is an important contribution to the
literature on Supreme Court legitimacy and has important implications for the Court.
KEYWORDS: Federalist Society, Supreme Court, Organizational Strength, Group
Polarization, Judicial Legitimacy
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Chapter One:
Introduction
On May 2, 2022, an early draft of a majority opinion for the Supreme Court case Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health was leaked. The leak made national headlines for several reasons.
First, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s health was a significant and politically salient case concerning
the issue of abortion. Specifically in question was whether the landmark Supreme Court decision
Roe v. Wade (1973), which guaranteed the right to abortion for women in the United States,
should be overturned. The decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, which was issued on
June 24, 2022, overturned Roe v. Wade and allowed states to impose abortion bans previously
deemed by the Courts to be unconstitutional. In the time between the decision issued in Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health and the publication of this dissertation less than two months later,
abortion policies in over a dozen states will have become dramatically more restrictive, with
several states going so far as to implement bans on abortion even in cases of rape and incest.
In addition to the impact the decision will have on women’s access to abortion in the
United States, the decision also highlights the power that the Federalist Society has over the legal
system in the United States. While the Federalist Society takes no official positions on specific
policy issues, the official website says that “the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy
Studies is a group of conservatives and libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal
order,” which they see as “strongly dominated by a form of orthodox liberal ideology which
advocates a centralized and uniform society” (About Us, 2022).
Simply put, the purpose of the Federalist Society is to make the United States legal
system more conservative. Members of the network influence court cases through a wide variety
of means—as litigants, as advocates presenting oral arguments before the Supreme Court, as
amicus curiae that support conservative case outcomes, as judges, as law clerks for justices of the
Supreme Court, and as justices themselves. In fact, six of the nine justices of the Supreme Court
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are associated with the Federalist Society. This means that their influence over the Supreme Court
is such that, on any given case, justices associated with the Federalist Society can form a majority
without the support of a single justice who is not associated with the network. Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health was one such case: the author of the leaked draft, Justice Alito, is associated
with the Federalist Society—as are all four other justices who ultimately voted to overturn Roe v.
Wade. Chief Justice John Roberts, who concurred in judgement, is also associated with the
Federalist Society.
The news of the leaked was draft was also significant because it highlighted the
willingness of justices associated with the Federalist Society to overturn a landmark precedent on
a highly salient political issue, and to reject the policy position supported by most Americans. In
the months prior to the decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, roughly 50% thought
should be upheld, while only 30% thought it should be overturned (Hubbard 2022; Romano
2022). The willingness of the Supreme Court to go against public opinion on this highly salient
issue has important implications for the legitimacy of the judicial branch and the Supreme Court,
especially if there are other salient policy issues on which the Supreme Court’s justices are
prepared to make decisions that reject public opinion. Outcomes such as the one in Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health may erode support for the Supreme Court among liberals and those who
support precedents that the justices associated with the Federalist Society eventually overturn.
The fact that these justices from the Federalist Society had the power and the inclination
to overturn a generally popular and highly salient precedent begs several important questions.
Where does their organizational strength come from? Aside from abortion, what are other policy
issues on which Federalist Society members have particularly conservative views? Is the
decision-making of judges from the Federalist Society driven by legal principles, such as a
preference for states’ rights, or by ideological concerns? And what impact can we expect the
Federalist Society to have on public perception of judicial legitimacy now that they have a
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dominant position atop the judicial hierarchy in the United States? My dissertation explores these
questions about the influence of the Federalist Society.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I ask: where does the Federalist Society’s
organizational strength come from? Law school student chapters provide essential opportunities
for young, conservative law students to network with other conservatives. Events hosted by
student chapters often feature notable conservative lawyers, judges, and professors who advocate
and spread legal arguments to support conservative policy positions. Thus, Federalist Society
student chapters play a central role in the socialization process for young, conservative attorneys.
Leveraging an original dataset on Federalist Society’s law school student chapters, I use factor
analysis to create an indicator of organizational strength for Federalist Society student chapters
and then evaluate the sources of the Federalist Society’s organizational strength. Conceptualizing
law students as grassroots-level actors and law professors as elite-level actors, this study finds
that the Federalist Society’s organizational strength is linked to both grassroots-level and elitelevel factors. At the grassroots level, Federalist Society student chapters are stronger when the
law school’s alumni are more conservative. Student chapters are also stronger when law school
students are more efficacious. These same factors—ideology and efficacy—also matter at the
elite level. When law professors are more conservative or more efficacious, Federalist Society
student chapters are also stronger. Additionally, conservative professors’ ideological grievances
influence student chapter strength: chapters are stronger when there is a larger ideological gap
between conservative law professors and the average law professor at the law school, or when
there is a larger ideological gap between conservative law professors and the law school’s alumni.
In the third chapter, I evaluate the influence of the Federalist Society on the voting
behavior of justices of the Supreme Court who are associated with the Federalist Society.
Drawing from numerous sources, I identify eight policy issues on which, due to the process of
group polarization, Federalist Society members are expected to be especially conservative. The
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results largely confirm these expectations, as Federalist Society members are especially likely to
cast conservative votes on cases involving abortion, affirmative action, campaign spending,
desegregation, religion, sex discrimination, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Although the Federalist Society does not officially claim to be in favor of states’ rights,
support for states’ rights to determine their own policies is strongly implied by the network’s
official website, which claims that the “strongly dominated by a form of orthodox liberal
ideology which advocates a centralized and uniform society” and that the Federalist Society “is a
group of conservatives and libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order.” The
implication, of course, is that if liberals prefer a centralized and uniform society, then
conservatives must prefer decentralization and policy heterogeneity, which can be achieved by
leaving states to make their own policies rather than enforcing a uniform policy across all 50
states. Thus, I also evaluate whether Federalist Society members are more likely than their peers
to vote in favor of the state government’s position when a state is involved in a case, or whether
their propensity to vote in favor of the state is contingent upon the ideological position being
advocated by the state.
The results suggest that justices of the Supreme Court who are associated with the
Federalist Society care more about casting conservative votes than about ruling in favor of the
state. Although Federalist Society members are more likely than their Republican-nominated
peers to cast pro-state votes when the state’s position in a case is conservative, they are more
likely to cast anti-state votes when the state’s position is liberal. These results indicate that, when
their legal preference for states’ rights and ideological preferences come into conflict, they are
more likely than their Republican-nominated peers to prioritize casting conservative votes over
voting in a manner consistent with their preference for states’ rights.
The fourth chapter asks, how does the Federalist Society influence public perception of
judicial legitimacy and public support for the courts? To answer this question, I employed a
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vignette experiment in which respondents were presented with articles concerning a (then)
forthcoming United States Supreme Court decision, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health. These
vignettes provided four descriptions of the expected majority coalition. The vignettes also
provided either general information about the Court and its recent history in abortion cases or
information about the number of justices of the Supreme Court who are associated with the
Federalist Society and information about the very conservative voting behavior of these justices
in past cases concerning abortion.
I evaluated whether these cues about the composition of the majority opinion or the
informational cues influenced individuals’ support for broadly targeted and narrowly targeted
court curbing measures. I found tentative support for the expectation that cues describing the
majority coalition as consisting of Republican-nominated justices, Federalist Society members, or
both will increase support for broadly targeted court curbing among liberals, but that does not
appear to be the case for conservatives. However, I do not find support for the other hypotheses
concerning the cues in this experiment. In the additional analyses for this study in which I
evaluate the roles of several ideological factors in shaping individuals’ support for broadly and
narrowly targeted court curbing measures, I present novel findings suggesting that the most
important ideological factor influencing support for broadly targeted court curbing is a
respondent’s degree of ideological polarization.
In sum, my dissertation focuses on the influence of the Federalist Society and expands
our knowledge of the network’s influence. To my knowledge, the study in Chapter Two is the
first to offer a quantitative assessment of both the grassroots-level and elite-level of any network
or social movement, and it provides important insights into where the Federalist Society’s
organizational strength comes from. Meanwhile, Chapter Three and Chapter Four, will be
worrying to those concerned with the Court’s legitimacy. These results indicate that the Federalist
Society may ultimately diminish the Court’s perceived legitimacy.
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Chapter Two:
The Sources of the Federalist Society’s Organizational Strength
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a network of conservative
and libertarian legal scholars, attorneys, and judges. The influence of the network and its
members on the United States’ legal system is exceptional. They act as the de facto gatekeeper in
the selection of judges under Republican presidential administrations—since 1990, every single
Supreme Court justice confirmed under a Republican administration has been affiliated with the
network. Their influence in the Supreme Court nomination process is so extensive that, today, six
of the nine justices on the Supreme Court are current or former members of the network. The
network’s members also act as prolific sources of legal arguments in favor of conservative policy
positions in legal cases, which they often provide through amicus briefs. However, their
influence begins in law schools, where the Federalist Society both exposes conservative law
students to legal arguments supporting conservative policy positions and integrates them into a
network that can be invaluable to their future careers as legal scholars, attorneys, and judges. The
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the sources of the Federalist Society’s organizational strength.
The Federalist Society network was conceived by three law school students who had
been friends as undergraduates at Yale University—Steven Calabresi, Lee Liberman Otis, and
David McIntosh (Kruse 2018). Calabresi would go on to attend Yale Law School, while
Liberman Otis and McIntosh enrolled at the University of Chicago Law School. Arriving at Yale
Law school in the fall of 1980, Calabresi quickly felt ideologically alienated among his law
school peers. The law school student body, he felt, was just as overwhelmingly liberal as the
undergraduate student body, and he perceived the law school faculty as even more liberal than the
faculty at Yale University. Feeling alienated based on his ideological views and believing that
conservative views were unwelcome in the law school, he sought to create a forum in which
conservative and libertarian law students could share their political views (Hicks 2006). By the
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fall of 1981, the Federalist Society was an official student organization at Yale Law School, and
in January 1982 the organization hosted its first event, which was a debate over Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
Meanwhile, at the University of Chicago Law School, Liberman Otis and McIntosh
experienced a similar ideological alienation to that experienced by Calabresi at Yale (Hicks
2006). Having remained in touch with Calabresi during law school, Liberman Otis and McIntosh
decided to create their own chapter of the Federalist Society at the University of Chicago Law
School. For their faculty advisor, they recruited Chicago professor Antonin Scalia who, at the
time, was visiting Stanford (Kruse 2018).
These two Federalist Society organizations decided to hold a symposium on conservative
legal thought in the spring of 1982. Through Scalia, Liberman and McIntosh learned of a similar
organization at Stanford—The Stanford Foundation for Law and Economic Policy—and recruited
them as a cosponsor of the event (Hicks 2006). Liberman also read an article referencing the
conservative Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, and reaching out to them, gained their
sponsorship and their agreement to publish the symposium’s proceedings. Thus, the four
cosponsors of the Federalist Society’s first annual symposium were Yale Federalist Society, the
Chicago Federalist Society, the Stanford Foundation for Law and Economic Policy, and the
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (Hicks 2006).
Their plan for the first symposium was ambitious, and the event would ultimately cost
nearly $25,000. Here, too, Scalia provided useful support for the fledgling organization. He spoke
with the conservative Institute for Educational Affairs (IEA) about helping to fund the event and
encouraged Calbresi to reach out to IEA for financial support. Ultimately, IEA would cover most
of the cost of the first symposium (Kruse 2018).
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The Federalist Society’s first symposium was wildly successful. Two hundred students
from over twenty law schools attended the two-day event, which was entitled "A Symposium on
Federalism: Legal and Political Ramifications" and which examined the foundations of
federalism, the politics of returning power to the states, and using the federal government to
achieve conservative goals, among other issues (Hicks 2006). The event featured a roster of
prominent judges (e.g.; Robert Bork and Richard Posner), professors (e.g.; Antonin Scalia and
Paul Bator), and practitioners (e.g.; Theodore Olson and Michael McConnell). The Harvard
JLPP published the symposium’s proceedings in a special issue and described the symposium as
“an exceptionally important event” that “proclaimed the virtues of individual freedom and limited
government.” (Hicks 2006).
Following the success of the first symposium, the founding students decided to hold a
second annual symposium the following year and to build a national organization because,
according to Lee Liberman Otis, “It seemed like the obvious thing to do. The thing was as much
demand-driven as anything” (Hicks 2006). Five months after the first symposium at Yale, the
Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies was officially formed as a non-profit
corporation (Kruse 2018). Currently, the Federalist Society has chapters at all 204 ABAaccredited law schools and, in the 2017-2018 academic year alone, these chapters held over 1,100
events with a total attendance of over 60,000 students (“About Us,” 2022).
The Federalist Society is undoubtedly a powerful network that exerts substantial
influence on law and politics. What is much less clear is where that power comes from. In this
paper, I focus on the sources of strength for law schools’ Federalist Society student chapters for
several reasons. First, choosing Federalist Society student chapters was a natural choice because
the organization was started by law students and at law schools. Second, prominent conservatives
within the legal field must think that law schools’ student chapters are important, as they often
serve as speakers at the events held by Federalist Society student chapters at law schools. Third,
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the events held by these student chapters contribute to conservative law students’ legal
socialization and provide them with strong legal arguments for conservative policy positions, and
thus likely have a strong influence on conservative law students’ legal thinking. And fourth, these
student chapters provide young, conservative law students with their first exposure to the
Federalist Society and a network of like-minded peers who can become part of their professional
network.
In this paper, I aim to evaluate the sources strength for Federalist Society student
chapters. I begin by discussing the scant prior research within political science pertaining to the
organization. Then, drawing on theories from social movement research, I derive testable
hypotheses about the sources of the strength of the Federalist Society student chapters at law
schools in the United States. Next, I introduce a novel dataset on Federalist Society student
chapters at the top 100 law schools in the United States. Then, I employ factor analysis to
generate a measure of organizational strength for law school student chapters of the Federalist
Society.
Finally, I evaluate my hypotheses concerning the sources of organizational strength. I
find that organizational strength is linked both to characteristics of law school students at the
grassroots level and to characteristics of law school faculty at the “elite” level. At the grassroots
level, law schools with more conservative students have stronger Federalist Society student
chapters, as do law schools with more efficacious students. These factors also matter at the elite
level: law schools with more conservative faculty and more efficacious faculty have stronger
Federalist Society student chapters. It also appears that grievance, operationalized as the
ideological conflict between conservative law faculty and a law school’s student body, impacts
organizational strength.
This paper makes important contributions to both the fields of judicial politics and the
social movement literature. It is important to understand where the Federalist Society’s strength
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comes from, as the network plays an influential role in judicial politics both now and for the
foreseeable future. To that end, this paper introduces an original dataset on law schools’
Federalist Society student chapters, creates statistically valid measures of organizational strength,
and provides the first-ever systematic quantitative assessment of the sources of organizational
strength. This study also contributes substantially to the academic discussion of the role of
grassroots vs. elite actors in social movements, as social movement research has historically
focused largely on the role of elite actors while paying less attention to the role of grassroots
members of an organization. The findings in this study suggest that both grassroots members of a
movement (in this case, law students) and elite actors (law professors) influence the strength of a
social movement organization (SMO).
Research on the Federalist Society
Much has been written about the Federalist Society by legal scholars. Works on the
Federalist Society from the legal field typically discuss the history of the network and provide
discussions of its members’ activities. For example, Teles (2008) provides a comprehensive
biographical history of the network, including numerous interviews from key members. In
another biographical account of the Federalist Society, Avery and McLaughlin (2013) provide
both an overview of the organization’s history and more comprehensive discussion of the various
policy issues in which key members of the Federalist Society have been deeply involved. Much
of the remaining work on the Federalist Society within the legal community effectively comes
from the Federalist Society itself: the Federalist Society-associated Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy has published countless articles on the Federalist Society, including the one
referenced in the introduction of this paper (Hicks 2006), which discusses the history and
formation of the network. While these books and articles from the legal community provide
valuable background information on the network, none of them provide systematic quantitative
analysis of the organization.
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Although six of the nine seats on the Supreme Court are now occupied by members of the
Federalist Society, there is surprisingly little research on the behavior of Federalist Society
members within the field of political science. One important article, Scherer and Miller (2009),
shows that not only are Federalist Society members on the U.S. Circuit Courts more conservative
than judges nominated by Democratic presidents, but they are also more conservative even than
other judges who were nominated by Republican presidents. There are also certain types of cases
on which they vote especially conservatively. Even after controlling for ideology, Federalist
Society members on the U.S. Circuit Courts vote more conservatively than do other Republicannominated judges on cases involving searches and seizure and on cases involving states’ rights.
Scherer and Miller (2009) is the only published article that focuses on the voting behavior of
Federalist Society members at any level within the judicial system.
Hollis-Brusky (2015) offers a useful way to think about the conservative legal network:
she conceives of the Federalist Society as a Political Epistemic Network (PEN), whose purpose is
to provide and spread policy-relevant legal knowledge to its members. In a series of case studies,
she reveals the network’s deep embeddedness in Supreme Court decision-making. Members of
the network play key roles in Supreme Court decision-making through their roles as litigants,
amici, Supreme Court law clerks, and even as Supreme Court justices themselves. HollisBrusky’s work and her conception of the PEN is particularly relevant to the current study.
Because, as she argues, a critical activity of the Federalist Society is spreading politically-relevant
legal knowledge among conservatives, my indicator of organizational strength incorporates a
measure of the extent to which student chapters facilitate the spread of politically-relevant legal
knowledge among conservative law students, operationalized as the total events hosted by the
student chapter. These events are the critical means by which chapters share politically-relevant
legal knowledge, and they typically involve either a speaker providing conservative legal
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arguments to law students or a debate in which both conservative and liberal legal arguments are
presented.
The Federalist Society as a Social Movement
An important question about the Federalist Society is: what is the source of the Federalist
Society’s strength? While the organization has three divisions (for law students, lawyers, and
faculty), the lifeblood of the organization is its student chapters that are embedded in every ABAaccredited law school in the United States. The student chapters are, after all, where the
organization began. The Student Division, in the organization’s own words, “fosters a network of
conservative and libertarian students eager to challenge the legal establishment as lawyers,
faculty, judges, and policymakers.” (https://fedsoc.org/divisions). Student chapters are the
essential component for the Federalist Society network, providing conservative and libertarian
aspiring attorneys with the legal network and politically-relevant legal knowledge that they will
use in their careers as lawyers, law school professors, judges, and politicians in the conservative
legal movement. Because the Federalist Society’s student chapters introduce conservative and
libertarian law students to both the arguments they will use to support conservative policy
positions and a network of likeminded members of the legal field with whom to coordinate their
legal activism, it is important to learn where the organizational strength of Federalist Society
student chapters comes from.
To derive theoretical expectations about the sources of student chapters’ organizational
strength, I turn to the literature on social movements. Examining the Federalist Society through
the lens of research on social movements is a fruitful approach, as the concept of the social
movement aptly describes the Federalist Society and its goals. A widely accepted account of
social movements describes them as “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of
individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of
shared collective identities” (Diani 1992).
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The Federalist Society consists of a series of networks of students at law schools and
attorneys in cities around the United States, and members of these networks are deeply involved
in advocating conservative policy positions, often on an informal basis (e.g., members often write
amicus curiae briefs or serve as attorneys in important court cases, but they do so on their own or
through an organization other than the Federalist Society). The Federalist Society and its
members undoubtedly are “engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared
collective identities.” Indeed, the inspiration for the conception of the Federalist Society was the
shared belief of its three co-founders—Steven Calabresi, Lee Liberman Otis, and David
McIntosh—that the legal academy and the legal profession more broadly was dominated by
liberals, that the legal profession was substantially more liberal than the public at large, and that
the success of conservative electoral politics at implementing their policy goals would require
reshaping the legal field to be amenable to arguments for conservative policy positions.
While the Federalist Society claims not to support any specific policy positions, even a
glimpse of the list of events held at its student chapters reveals that policy—and not just law—is
clearly important to the organization and its members. For instance, on the website FedSoc.org,
which lists events for many law schools’ Federalist Society chapters, the subdomain for the
Student Chapter at Yale Law School (where the Federalist Society was conceived and where its
first annual symposium was hosted) includes events entitled “Litigating Obamacare and
Boumediene,” “The Future of Judicial Conservatism,” “What Offenses Rise to the Level of Being
‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors?’, “Corporate Constitutional Rights Ten Years After Citizens
United,” “Beyond Economic Piety: How to Focus Policymakers on Sustaining a Healthy
Society,” during the 2020-2021 school year. Meanwhile, the University of Pennsylvania Student
Chapter, which hosted the annual National Student Symposium on March 19, 2021, has hosted
six other events in 2021, including “The Future of the ACA,” “Religious Education and School
Choice,” “Impeaching a Former President,” and “Religious Liberty in the Age of COVID-19.”
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While these titles do pertain to legal issues, they also clearly invoke policy issues—including
President Obama’s Affordable Care Act, the impeachment(s) of Donald Trump, campaign
finance, conservative religious positions, marijuana policy, and other important political issues on
which conservatives often have strong preferences. These events provide a forum where
prominent conservative legal scholars can transmit strong legal arguments to support conservative
policy positions to receptive conservative law students, giving those students the tools to hone
their legal arguments in support of conservative policy outcomes.
Why People Protest
A large literature on social movements has stressed three broad sets of factors that
influence the emergence, development, and impact of social movements: the political
opportunities and constraints that the would-be movement faces, mobilizing structures, and
framing processes (McAdam 2017). However, this literature generally focuses on the how those
factors influence social movements, rather than the causes of individuals choosing to participate
in social movements.
Klandermans (1984) notes that social movement researchers “went too far in nearly
abandoning the social-psychological analyses of social movements” and made the case for
incorporating insights from psychology into the study of social movement participation. While
organization-centric perspectives persist as the major focus of much research on social
movements, a subfield focused on individual-level participation in social movements has emerged
over the last several decades. Borrowing from economic theory, Klandermans (2004) develops a
theory of social movement participation that incorporates the concepts of demand for a social
movement (among potential movement members), supply of social movement organizations, and
mobilization to bring demand and supply together.
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This study focuses on demand-side causes of participation in a movement. Recent
research on the demand-side causes of participation focuses on the psychological factors of
individuals’ grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions, and embeddedness within a movement
network (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and
Walgrave 2018). In this study, I generate five testable hypotheses concerning the sources of
Federalist Society student chapter strength based on the roles of identity, efficacy, and grievances.
I turn to each of these next.
Group Identification
Group identification plays an important role in leading individuals to participate in a
social movement, and this has been illustrated in a variety of contexts. For example, women’s
collective identification as women made it more likely for women to participate in a women’s
movement (Kelly and Breinlinger 1995; 1996). Similarly, older people in Germany who
identified with the older people’s movement known as the Gray Panthers were more willing to
participate, and gay people in the United States who identified with the gay movement were also
more willing to participate (Simon et al. 1998).
Various studies have corroborated that identification with a group positively influences
willingness to participate, even after controlling for other factors (see Stürmer et al. 2003; Tindall
2004). Not only does identification with a group matter, but so too does the strength of that
identification (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). Politicization of
group identity influences willingness to participate, although findings are mixed. Some
researchers argue that the politicization of group identity amplifies the linkage between identity
and action (Stürmer and Simon 2004), while others argue that group identification must be
politicized in order to influence participation (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010).
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Regardless of which of these two perspectives is correct, in the context of the
conservative legal movement, the relevant identity—that is, as a conservative—is inherently
political. Where the conservative legal movement has a larger population of conservatives from
which to draw, it should be stronger. An important distinction that this study makes is delineation
between movement elites and grassroots members of the movement. Because professors are longterm and quasi-institutional members of each law school’s student chapter and because they can
facilitate the organization’s activities through serving as legitimizers of the network and speakers
at events, they can be viewed as network elites. Meanwhile, law students are only at the law
school for three years and may not have as much long-term commitment, institutional knowledge,
or embeddedness in the network as professors. In the context of the conservative legal movement,
law students can be seen as grassroots members. I expect that both elites and grassroots members
influence the strength of a social movement.
At the grassroots level, because identity as a conservative will play an important role in
terms of motivating law students to join the Federalist Society, law schools with more
conservative student bodies should have stronger Federalist Society student chapters. Likewise, at
the elite level, law schools with more conservative professors should also have stronger Federalist
Society student chapters.
H1: Law schools with more conservative students should have stronger Federalist
Society student chapters.
H2: Law schools with more conservative professors should have stronger Federalist
Society student chapters.
Efficacy
Efficacy refers to whether an individual has the expectation that policies or conditions
can be changed through protest (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, and Van Stekelenburg 2008).
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Much of the research concerning efficacy treats efficacy as an independent variable predicting
various forms of collective action. For instance, Klandermans (1997) shows that when people
believe that protest will address their grievances at an affordable cost, they are more likely to
participate. Furthermore, efficacy appears to be positively associated with low- and moderate-cost
collective action (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, and Young 2015). Even after controlling for other
individual-level determinants of participation (such as identity and emotion), efficacy appears to
be positively and significantly related to an individual’s propensity to participate in protests
(Chan 2016). While the literature pertaining to efficacy generally focuses on how efficacy
predicts behavior, it does provide some insight on the sources of efficacy.
Two studies are helpful here. Paulsen (1991) finds that academic success is a strong
predictor of an individual’s feelings of political efficacy, and a feeling of political efficacy
facilitates political participation, while Bowler and Donovan (2002) find that education is a strong
predictor of efficacy. Typically, studies that evaluate the effects of efficacy rely on measures
based on survey responses. Such data isn’t available here. However, since academic success
predicts efficacy, I can use indicators of academic success, or the quality of students and
professors, as measures to capture the average efficacy of students and professors at a law school.
This allows me to evaluate where efficacy matters: at the grassroots level, at the elite level, or at
both. I expect that law schools with higher-quality students will have stronger Federalist Society
student chapters because their law students at the grassroots level will be more efficacious.
Similarly, I expect that law schools with higher-quality faculty will also have stronger Federalist
Society student chapters because their faculty at the elite level are more efficacious.
H3: Law schools with more efficacious students should have stronger Federalist Society
student chapters.
H4: Law schools with more efficacious professors should have stronger Federalist
Society student chapters.
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Grievance
Early work in social movements focused largely on relative deprivation and the role of
the perceived or relative severity of a group’s grievances (see Davies 1962, 1969; Smelser 1963;
Geschwender 1968; Gurr 1970). Although later researchers often claimed that the role of
grievance in influencing protest was either exaggerated or nonexistent (see McCarthy and Zald
1977; Tilly 1977; McAdam 1999), the role of grievance has been given more credence in recent
years (see Snow and Soule 2010; Simmons 2014; Almeida 2018). Indeed, Snow and Soule
(2010, p. 23) argue that “none of the various sets of conditions necessary for the emergence and
operation of social movements is more important that the generation of deeply felt shared
grievances.” While grievances have traditionally been framed as materially constituted,
grievances need not be material. Simmons (2014) argues that grievances can also be ideationally
constituted, while Swank et al. (2020) find that grievance in the form of heterosexist
discrimination makes college students more likely to engage in pro-LGBT protests.
In the context of the Federalist Society and its law school organizations, there are two
ways in which conservative law professors might experience relative deprivation and grievance
with respect to ideology. First, law professors might experience a feeling of grievance based on
the ideological differences between themselves and the student body at the law school. For
example, a conservative professor may observe that students are generally liberal and, feeling
deprived of a like-minded student body, choose to associate with and help strengthen the law
school’s Federalist Society student chapter. And second, they might experience ideological
grievance when comparing their own views to those of other law professors at the university
where they teach. For example, they might observe that other faculty are much more liberal than
themselves, and choose to associate with and help strengthen the student chapter in order to help
young conservative law students become successful in order to reduce the perceived lack of
conservatives among elites in the broader legal network. When there is a larger ideological gap
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between a law school’s conservative faculty members and the law school’s average student,
conservative faculty should be more inclined to have feelings of relative deprivation that lead
them to become more active in the law school’s Federalist Society student chapter. Likewise,
when there is a larger ideological gap between a law school’s conservative faculty members and
the law school’s average professor, conservative faculty should also be more inclined to have
feelings of relative deprivation that lead them to become more active in the law school’s
Federalist Society student chapter. These theoretical explanations for the effects of grievance on
Federalist Society student chapter strength led to two hypotheses:
H5: As the ideological gap between a law school’s conservative faculty and the law
school’s average student increases, the strength of the law school’s Federalist Society
student chapter should increase.
H6: As the ideological gap between a law school’s conservative faculty and the law
school’s average law professor increases, the strength of the law school’s Federalist
Society student chapter should increase.
Research Design
Because there are no extant datasets on the characteristics of the Federalist Society
organization or on any of the individual Student Chapters, creating a measure of organizational
strength for the law school chapters required a substantial data collection effort. To make the
project more tractable, I focused my data collection efforts on the top 100 law schools in the US,
as judged by the US New and World Report rankings. Due to tied rankings, 101 law schools
were included in this list. I then collected data on Federalist Society student chapters, which I
hand-coded based on content analysis of a variety of sources. This data collection process took
place between April 1, 2020, and June 1, 2020, and was used to collect a wide variety of
information from Federalist Society student chapters. In total, I collected information on 73

19

variables. Of these, 33 variables indicated a type of officer position, with the other 40 variables
collecting other attributes of each chapter.
The data collection process involved a systematic, sequential series of online searches.
For each university, I began by searching the law school’s website for information on student
organizations. Most Federalist Society student chapters either had dedicated subdomains within
the law school website or appeared on lists of student organizations for the law school but did not
have their own subdomain in the law school’s website. Five law school student chapters had their
own standalone websites. Another 11 were not listed on the law school’s student organization
page, did not have their own subdomain, and did not have a standalone website. Additionally,
every law school’s student chapter had a subdomain listed on the Federalist Society’s official
website, fedsoc.org. These subdomains typically (but not always) list the names and positions of
officers for the law school’s student chapter.
I began by gathering information on the number of officers each Federalist Society
student chapter had. This information was often available on the law school website’s subdomain
for the Federalist Society student chapter or, less frequently, on the law school’s student
organizations page. In cases where neither of these two approaches worked, I was sometimes
able to find officer information on the chapter’s Facebook or Twitter page. When none of these
methods produced officer information, I relied on information from the fedsoc.org subdomain for
the Federalist Society student chapter. When information was available from multiple sources, I
relied on the source that provided the most comprehensive information. For instance, some
chapters’ Facebook pages or law school subdomains provided substantially more information on
officers than did the fedsoc.org subdomain, and in these cases I deferred to the Facebook page or
the subdomain.
From these sources, created the variables for 33 officer positions based on the types of
officer positions at each law school’s student chapter. Next, I created the variable Total Officers,
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indicating the total number of officers listed for the student chapter. This value ranges from 0 to
33, with a mean of 5.45. Only two law schools’ Federalist Society student chapters had over 20
officers—Columbia Law School (with 21) and Yale Law School (33). The variable Total Officers
can roughly be seen as an indicator of both chapter size and level of organizational complexity.
After collecting information on the number and types of official positions for student
officers at the organization, I gathered numerous additional indicators of Federalist Society
student chapter strength. These measures were chosen because they provide information about the
student chapter’s size, level of organizational complexity, level of activity, and reputation, and
they were created by evaluating each student chapter’s social media presence, collecting
information on each chapter’s events, and collecting information about awards won by each
chapter.
First, I searched for student chapter social media accounts across five platforms:
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and Soundcloud. Social media accounts for law schools’
student chapters were sometimes linked in the law school’s student organization page or the
Federalist Society subdomain on the law school website. When they were not linked, I searched
for them manually. For each law school, I collected the number of social media platforms and
created a count variable Platforms. The number of Platforms could theoretically range from 0 to
5, but the actual values for Platforms ranged from 0 to 4 since no school had all 5 platforms. The
mean for the variable Platforms was 1.68.
Next, I created the variable Total Followers, indicating the total number of followers the
student chapter had across all social media platforms. These values ranged from 0 (for student
chapters with no social media presence) to 2,309 in the case of Harvard Law School. The mean
value for Total Followers was 301.49. The variable Platforms is an indicator of organizational
complexity, while the variable Total Followers is an indicator of chapter size and level of
activity.
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Because Hollis-Brusky (2015) argues that an important function of the Federalist Society
is to spread politically relevant legal knowledge among conservatives, my measure of
organizational strength should include an indicator of the extent to which Federalist Society
student chapters actively facilitate the spread of politically relevant legal knowledge among
conservative law students. At student chapters, the most critical way this information is spread is
through events hosted by student chapters. These events come largely in two forms: they most
frequently involve guests from the legal field—typically judges, law professors, or attorneys—
who are invited to speak about a specific topic, but they can also feature two (or more) guests
who debate a specific legal topic or policy issue while presenting liberal and conservative legal
arguments in favor of liberal and conservative policy positions. To capture the extent to which a
Federalist Society student chapter actively works to spread politically relevant knowledge among
its members, I generated a count variable Total Events, which indicates the number of events the
Federalist Society student chapter hosted between January 1, 2019, and April 1, 2020. This
information was available on fedsoc,org. On that website, each law school’s Federalist Society
student chapter has a subdomain with a list of events held by that chapter arranged in
chronological order, with the most recent events listed first. When an event had been scheduled
for the period between March 1, 2020, and April 1, 2020, but was cancelled due to the COVID-19
pandemic, I counted the event towards the law school’s Total Events. The values for Total Events
ranged from 0 to 40, with a mean of 7.62. Total Events is an indicator of the student chapter’s
level of activity. This measure does not distinguish between events in which speakers present
only conservative arguments and those in which a debate features both conservative and legal
arguments. I decided not to exclude debates from this indicator because although conservative
law students will hear liberal legal arguments at these events, they will still hear conservative
legal arguments.
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Finally, I created two measures of each chapter’s reputation by counting the awards given
to each student chapter by the national organization and by counting the number of Joseph Story
Awards won by a law professor at each university. Unfortunately, information on the Federalist
Society student chapter awards is not kept on a single website or subdomain of the Federalist
Society. I gathered this information through extensive online searches for key terms, including
the names of the awards. Information was sometimes available on a law school’s Facebook page
when that law school was the recipient of an award. Other times, that information was available
as a press release or other article on the law school’s website. In all, I found 36 student chapter
awards given between 2011 and 2021. This variable, Student Chapter Award Total, ranges from
0 to 7, with a mean of 0.36. Information on the Joseph Story Award is available at the fedsoc.org
subdomain https://fedsoc.org/joseph-story-award. This award is given by the Federalist Society to
one law faculty member at one university each year and has been given out 26 times as of 2021. I
coded this variable based on where the law professor taught in the year that they won the award,
rather than where they teach now. The values for Story Award Total range from 0 to 4, with a
mean of 0.26. These two variables—Student Chapter Award Total and Story Award Total—are
indicators of student chapter reputation.
I merged this original dataset with data from four other sources. First, I merged it with
data from the Internet Legal Research Group, using their 2020 rankings (data available at
https://www.ilrg.com/rankings/law/). Specifically, I used this website’s information on each law
school’s undergraduate GPA scores (25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile), LSAT scores
(25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile), student: faculty ratio, and the number of volumes in
the law school’s library. Next, I merged the dataset with data on the political ideologies of alumni
at law schools (from Bonica et al. 2016) and data on the political ideologies of law professors at
each law school (from Bonica et al. 2018). The measure of alumni ideology is a proxy for a
measure of student ideology since those authors did not measure the ideologies of current law
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students. While this measure is not perfect, it is reasonable to assume that the alumni ideology is
strongly associated with student ideology. Finally, I merged the dataset with data on the quality of
professors at 100 law schools (from Heald and Sichelman 2019). Their measure of professor
quality is based on two factors: the number of HEIN citations to papers published by each law
school’s professors and the number of SSRN downloads of those publications. For each law
school, the authors calculate Z-scores for both HEIN citations and SSRN downloads, and then
computes the average of those scores to generate the measure Average Z-score. This final
measure, therefore, incorporates components indicative of both faculty success in publishing and
the impact of their published work.
Chapter Strength
The dependent variable Chapter Strength is a measure of organizational strength, which
was created through exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Factor analysis has been employed
fruitfully as a data reduction method not only within political science but specifically within
judicial politics (see Ducat and Dudley 1987, Ostberg et al. 2002, Wedeking 2010; Black et al.
2016; Gibson and Nelson 2017). EPA is a useful method for my purposes because it allows for
the creation of a single variable based on multiple indicators of Chapter Strength.
The indicators used to generate the measure of Chapter Strength are as follows: (1) Total
Officers; (2) Total Followers; (3) Total Events; (4) Student Chapter Award Total; (5) Story
Award Total; and (6) Platforms. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for these six indicators.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for six indicators of Chapter Strength
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Total Officers

101

5.4455

4.7947

0

33

Total Followers

101

301.4851

364.8831

0

2209

Total Events

101

7.6238

8.6161

0

40

Student Chapter Award Total

101

0.3564

0.9755

0

7

Story Award Total

101

0.2574

0.6427

0

4

Platforms

101

1.6832

0.8937

0

4

Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for each of the six variables to be used in generating a
single measure of Chapter Strength.

These six variables were next subjected to factor analysis. Before estimating the factor
analysis routine, the first step for a researcher is data inspection to check for the violation of
statistical assumptions. Specifically, this entails checking for KMO, which tells us whether there
is sufficient variance within the dataset to identify latent factors and perform EFA. Howard
(2016) recommends that when using the KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy—whose possible
values range between 0.00 and 1.00—researchers should seek values above 0.60 before
performing EFA. As Table A1 in the Appendix reports, the KMO Measure of Sampling
Adequacy for this sample is quite good, with each individual score above 0.81 and the overall
composite value at 0.8406.
After inspecting the data, the next step is to select the method of factor analysis.
Although the most used method of factor analysis is principal component analysis (PCA),
Howard (2016) recommends against using PCA for two major reasons. First, despite its wide use,
is not actually a form of factor analysis and it does not account for the structure of correlations
and instead only accounts for the variance of measured variables. As such, it is not a true form of
factor analysis (Howard 2016). Second, EFA methods account for both common and unique
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variance within measured variables and the resultant factors are derived from common variance
alone, whereas PCA makes no distinction between common variance and unique variance,
leading to components that represent both common variance and unique variance. In other words,
PCA (unrealistically) assumes that the individual measures are without error. For these reasons, I
employ the iterated principal-factor method of factor analysis, which does not rely on the
unrealistic assumption that the individual measures are errorless. Results of this analysis are
reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. As it shows, the first factor has an eigenvalue of over 2.98,
while the highest eigenvalue for any other factor is less than 0.31.
Next, the researcher must determine a method of factor retention. Historically, the most
popular method has been to use the Kaiser criterion, according to which researchers should retain
all factors with eigenvalues above 1. Using the Kaiser criterion would lead to the retention of one
factor, as one factor has an eigenvalue of 2.98 and all others have eigenvalues below 1. This
method, however, has been denounced by numerous authors (see Costello and Osborne 2005;
Howard 2016) in favor of the visual scree plot (VSP). When using VSP analysis, researchers plot
each eigenvalue on a graph and identify a cutoff (or “elbow”) at which successive decreases in
eigenvalues become less noticeable. The VSP in Figure 2.1 indicates that there is one latent factor
that drives the variation in the six indicators of Chapter Strength. Velicer’s Minimum Average
Partial (MAP) test confirms that one factor should be retained.
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Figure 2.1: Visual Scree Plot (VSP) Analysis for Chapter Strength Components

Figure 2.1 provides a Visual Scree Plot (VSP) for the latent factors identified through the iterated
principal-factor method of factor analysis. These results suggest that the measure Chapter
Strength has one latent factor.

The next decision for the researcher concerns the method of matrix rotation. This
decision is trivial since there is only one retained factor. Nonetheless, I follow the
recommendations of Howard (2016) and use a direct oblimin rotation with a delta of zero, which
is also called a direction quartimin. Finally, the research must evaluate the variables’ loading
factors to determine the extent to which each variable represents the factor or factors produced
through factor analysis. Following the recommendation of Howard (2016), I employ a primary
factor loading cutoff of 0.4. As Table 2.2 indicates, all six variables load well above the 0.4
cutoff. Factor loadings range from 0.5482 (for Story Award Total) to 0.8163 (for Total
Followers).
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Table 2.2: Factor Loadings on Factor 1 (Chapter Strength)
Variable

Factor 1
Total Officers
0.7420
Total Followers
0.8163
Total Events
0.7220
Student Chapter Award Total
0.6788
Story Award Total
0.5482
Platforms
0.6168
Table 2.2 reports Factor Loadings for the six indicators used to generate Chapter Strength.

These analyses establish several important conclusions. First, the KMO Measure of
Sampling Adequacy indicates that the six variables used in this factor analysis satisfy the
assumptions of factor analysis. Second, factor analysis of the six indicators of chapter strength
clearly point to one latent factor driving these variables. Hereafter, that factor will be called
Chapter Strength. And third, all six variables load onto Chapter Strength sufficiently to merit
inclusion. Thus, the iterated principal-factor method of factor analysis provides a useful method
for collapsing multiple variables into a single, valid indicator of Chapter Strength. Table 2.3
reports the top 20 law schools in terms of Chapter Strength.
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Table 2.3: Top 20 Law Schools by Chapter Strength
Law School

Chapter Strength

Law School Rank

University of Chicago

3.620

4

Harvard University

3.457

3

Yale University

3.059

1

University of Virginia

2.812

8

University of Pennsylvania

2.008

7

Columbia University

1.944

4

Brigham Young University

1.539

37

University of Kentucky

1.281

70

Georgetown University

1.277

14

Notre Dame University

1.271

22

Stanford University

1.126

2

Duke University

1.024

12

Northwestern University

0.928

9

George Washington University

0.913

23

Florida International University

0.823

90

George Mason University

0.779

42

Cornell University

0.745

13

University of Florida

0.725

24

Arizona State University

0.553

24

University of Minnesota

0.485
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Table 2.3 list the top 20 law schools in terms of Federalist Society Chapter Strength.
Figure 2.2 graphs the relationship between law schools’ rank and Chapter Strength for all
law schools in the dataset and includes a locally weighted regression of the effect of rank on
Chapter Strength. Chapter Strength serves as the dependent variable for the study that follows.
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, high-ranking law schools typically relatively high values of Chapter
Strength, while lower-ranking law schools tend to have lower values of Chapter Strength.
Additionally, the curve of the locally weighted regression suggests that rank may have a greater
influence on Chapter Strength at high-ranking law schools that at lower-ranked law schools.
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Figure 2.2: The Relationship between Law School Rank and Federalist Society Student
Chapter Strength

.
Figure 2.2 graphs the relationship between law school rank and Chapter Strength.

An indicator generated via factor analysis will have a mean value of 0, and thus the mean
value of Chapter Strength for the top 100 law schools is 0. Values range from -1.083 at the low
end (corresponding to the University of Oklahoma College of Law and the University of Hawai’i
at Mānoa William S. Richardson School of Law) to 3.620 at the high end (corresponding to the
University of Chicago Law School). The standard deviation in Chapter Strength for the top 100
law schools is 0.929.
There are eight key independent variables in this study. The first, Student Ideology, is
based on each law school’s alumni CFscores. CFscores stands for common-space campaign
finance scores. First developed by Bonica (2014), CFscores are similar to NOMINATE ideology
scores and Martin-Quinn ideology scores, which are often used as measures of legislative
ideology and judicial ideology, respectively. The crucial difference is that rather than being based
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on voting behavior, CFscores are based on campaign contributions and work on the principle that
an individual who donates x amount of dollars to a Democrat is more liberal than another
individual who donates x amount of dollars to a Republican, and an individual who donates to
both Democrats and Republicans is more moderate than someone who donates only to candidates
from one party. CFscores take campaign contribution data and rescale them into a unidimensional
scale where negative scores indicate liberal ideology, and positive scores indicate conservative
ideology. Perhaps the greatest benefit of CFscores is that because they are based on campaign
contributions rather than voting behavior, CFscores can be used to evaluate the ideologies of
individuals who are not legislators or judges1. The measure Student Ideology, which is the mean
CFscores measure for a law school’s alumni, comes from Bonica et al. (2016), who graciously
provided me with the mean CFscore for each law school’s alumni in their dataset. The variable,
renamed as Student Ideology, is used to evaluate whether the average ideology of students
influences Federalist Society student Chapter Strength (H1).
I use two measures of professor ideology, which are both based on measures
from Bonica et al. (2018). These authors provided me with their measures of the mean law
professor ideology, the standard deviation for professor ideology, and the ideology for professors
at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles in terms of conservatism. In the analyses that follow, I use
the mean law professor ideology at a university (Professor IdeologyMean) and the ideology of law
professors at the 75th percentile in terms of conservatism (Professor IdeologyP75) as indicators of
professor ideology. These measures are used to evaluate the influence of law professor ideology
on Chapter Strength (H2).

1

One downside of the CFscore measure is that for an individual to have a CFscore, they must first have
chosen to donate to a political candidate’s campaign. As such, this data is typically skewed towards older
and wealthier individuals.

31

Recall that efficacy is closely associated with academic success (Bowler and Donovan
2002). I use two indicators for law student efficacy, each of which either directly comes from the
ILRG data or is based on data from the ILRG. The first of these, LSATMedian, is a measure of the
median LSAT score for each law school’s students. The second measure, Entrance Scores, is also
based on the ILRG data, but it is a measure created through factor analysis combining six
components: the 25th percentile LSAT score for the law school (LSATLow), the median LSAT
score (LSATMedian), the 75th percentile LSAT score (LSATHigh), the 25th percentile
undergraduate GPA for the law school (GPALow), the median GPA (GPAMedian), and the 75th
percentile GPA (GPAHigh). The KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy confirms the
appropriateness of using these measures for factor analysis, and the visual scree plot (VSP)
confirms that using these six factors for iterated principal-factor analysis reveals one latent factor.
I call this measure Entrance Scores. Results for the KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy, a
visual scree plot for eigenvalues, and a table for primary factor loadings—all available in the
Appendix—reveal that there is sufficient variation in the dataset for the detection of latent factors,
that they load onto one factor, and that all six measures of undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores
load heavily onto that factor, Entrance Scores. Both LSATMedian and Entrance Scores are used
to evaluate the influence of student efficacy on Federalist Society student Chapter Strength (H3).
To evaluate the influence of law professor efficacy on Chapter Strength (H4), I use
measures from Heald and Sichelman (2019). Those authors created scores for professor quality
by based on an analysis of the published works of professors at 100 law schools (although some
of the top 100 law schools were not included in this analysis). As discussed earlier, their measure
has two components: HEIN Z-scores (indicating the publication success of the law school
faculty) and SSRN Z-scores (indicating the reputation of the law school faculty). Their final
measure, Average Z-score, is the average of the HEIN Z-score and the SSRN Z-score for each
law school’s professors. It should be noted here that although they generate measures for 100 law
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schools, they do not generate measures for 11 of the 101 law schools included among top 100 law
schools according to US News and World Report (2021). For the purposes of this study, I rename
the variable Average Z-Score as Professor Quality.
There are two remaining key independent variables which are used to measure the
influence of professors’ ideological grievance on Chapter Strength. To evaluate conservative
professors’ ideological grievance with law students, I subtract the law school’s mean alumni
CFscore (Student Ideology) from the CFscore for the law school’s 75th percentile law professor in
terms of ideological conservatism (Professor IdeologyP75) such that Ideological ConflictStudents =
Professor IdeologyP75 – Student Ideology. This measure allows me to assess whether an increase
in the ideological gap (or ideological grievance) between conservative professors and students at
a law school predicts greater Chapter Strength. Ideological ConflictStudents is used to evaluate H5.
Alternatively, Chapter Strength may be driven by conservative professors’ ideological
grievances with their peers, rather than by their grievances with the student body. To evaluate the
influence of conservative professors’ ideological grievance with other professors at the law
school on Chapter Strength, I subtract the law school’s mean professor CFscore (Professor
IdeologyMean) from the CFscore for a professor at the 75th percentile in terms of conservatism at
that law school (Professor IdeologyP75) such that Ideological ConflictProfessors = Professor
IdeologyP75 – ProfessorIdeologyMean. Ideological ConflictProfessors allows me to assess whether an
increase in the ideological gap (or ideological grievance) between conservative professors and the
average professor at a law school predicts greater Chapter Strength. Ideological ConflictProfessors is
used to evaluate H6.
In addition to these key independent variables that are used to test the six major
hypotheses, I include a variety of control variables. To allay the potential concern that Chapter
Strength might be driven by the law school’s capacity for developing student organizations, I
generate the variable Law School Orgs, which indicates the number of student organizations at
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each law school. Likewise, the number of journals at the law school is another indicator of the
law school’s capacity for developing organizations. The variable Journals is a count variable
indicating the number of law journals published by the law school. Law School Orgs and
Journals are valuable control variables because they provide indicators for the general level of
student engagement and activity at a law school. Without these variables, a law school whose
students are generally highly active and whose student organizations are generally highly
professionalized might appear to have particularly strong Federalist Society student chapters
when it may simply be the case that many or all student organizations at the law school are highly
active and professionalized.
The capacity for developing strong student organizations may also be linked to the
number of students at the law school. The US News (2021) rankings include the number of fulltime students at each law school, and I call this variable Full-Time Enrollment. Likewise, since
law schools often require student organizations to have faculty advisors and because for some
organizations (such as the Federalist Society) faculty may play an important role in generating
and maintaining organizational strength, I create a measure of the number of professors at the law
school based on Full-Time Enrollment and the Student: Faculty ratio (SFRatio), which is
available in the ILRG data, by dividing Full-Time Enrollment by SFRatio. Thus, the indicator
Professors = Full-Time Enrollment/SFRatio.
Another important consideration is the amount of physical and financial resources that a
law school provides to its students. I do not have a direct measure of either the law school’s
endowment or the buildings or physical space available at each law school, but I do have an
indirect measure of both financial resources and strength: Library, which is available in the ILRG
data, is a measure of the total number of volumes in each law school’s library. Because the
maintenance of a large library requires both financial resources and physical space, the variable
Library serves as an indirect indicator of financial and physical resources.
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From a methodological standpoint (e.g., limited degrees of freedom, collinearity, etc.),
however, I cannot justify using all five of these indicators in the same model. Table A3 in the
Appendix reports the pairwise correlation coefficients for these five variables and reveals that
Full-Time Enrollment is highly correlated with Law School Orgs, Journals, and Professors, while
Journals is also highly correlated with Professors. To overcome this issue, I use iterated
principal-factor analysis to collapse Professors, Library, Full-Time Enrollment, Journals, and
Law School Orgs into a one-dimensional indicator Resources, which allows me to include all five
in my analysis while allaying potential concerns about collinearity. Validation for the measure
Resources may be found in the Appendix. Each model in the analysis that follows uses either
Resources or Full-Time Enrollment to control for the law school’s capacity for developing strong
student organizations.
It is also possible that differences in Chapter Strength might be influenced by whether the
law school is public or private. To control for this potential confounding factor, I create a binary
variable indicating whether the law school is public or private. Public is coded as 1 if the law
school is public, and 0 if it is private.
Summary statistics for the dependent variable Chapter Strength and the independent
variables discussed above are included in Table 2.42. Each of the analyses that follow use
ordinary least squares (OLS) models in which the dependent variable is Chapter Strength.

2

Data on professor ideology was missing for one law school (Texas A&M) and data on alumni ideology
was missing for seven law schools: Florida International University, Loyola Marymount, UNLV, UCIrivine, Texas A&M, Yeshiva, and Rutgers. Thus, while I collect variables for the 101 law schools ranked
in the top 100 by US News, regression results for student impact include only 94 law schools. For
Professor Quality, because Heald and Sichelman (2019) did not include all of the top 101 universities,
there is additional missing data for the University of South Carolina, St. Louis University, Lewis and Clark,
Drexel University, Northeastern University, the University of Louisville, the University of New
Hampshire, the University of New Hampshire, Louisiana State University, Florida International University,
and Texas A&M. The missing data is unlikely to introduce any substantial systematic bias in the results, as
none of the missing data comes from top 25 law schools, and it does not appear that missing data for
Professor Quality is systematically biased towards either conservative or liberal law school student bodies.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variable (Chapter Strength) and Independent
Variables
Variable
Observations
Mean
Std. Dev
Min
Max
Chapter Strength
101
0
0.93
-1.08
3.62
Student Ideology
94
-0.51
0.36
-1.16
0.83
Professor Ideology Mean
100
-0.85
0.32
-1.29
0.64
Professor IdeologyP75
100
-0.61
0.55
-1.22
1.19
LSAT Median
100
161.16
4.96
153
173
Entrance Scores
100
0
1.00
-1.79
2.51
Professor Quality
90
0.06
0.99
-1.32
3.91
Ideological ConflictStudents
94
-0.08
0.39
-1.05
1.44
Ideological ConflictProfessors
100
0.46
0.30
0.07
1.70
Resources
100
0
0.97
-1.11
3.79
Full-Time Enrollment
101
624.58
294.12
227
1788
Public
101
0.56
0.50
0
1
Table 2.4 provides summary statistics for the variables included in this study. Chapter Strength is
the dependent variable.

Before getting to the analysis, one research design issue must be addressed. A challenge
that complicates the evaluation of the sources of Chapter Strength is that several of the variables
used in this analysis are correlated with each other to such an extent that they cannot be used
simultaneously in the same model. For instance, LSAT Median, Entrance Scores, and Professor
Quality are all highly correlated with law school rank (with the absolute value of coefficients over
0.72 in each case), so no model can simultaneously include a measure of rank and either student
quality or professor quality. Similarly, correlation coefficients for Professor Quality and the two
measures of student quality (LSAT Median and Entrance Scores) are 0.82 and 0.80, respectively.
Thus, the effects of Professor Quality and student quality cannot be evaluated simultaneously. As
such, I must model the impacts of student ideology and student quality (H1 and H3) separately
from the impacts of professor ideology and professor quality (H2 and H4). Additionally, the
correlation coefficients between Professor IdeologyMean, Professor IdeologyP75, and Ideological
ConflictStudents are sufficiently high that I cannot evaluate the influence of professor ideology and
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quality on Chapter Strength in a model that also evaluates the impact of professors’ ideological
grievance on Chapter Strength. For these reasons, the results that follow will be subdivided into
three parts.
Results
Student Impact
Table 2.5 reports the OLS regression results to assess the influence of Student Ideology
(H1) and student quality (H3) on Chapter Strength. Model 1 and Model 2 use LSATMedian as the
measure of student quality, whereas Model 3 and Model 4 use Entrance Scores. To control for the
law school’s capacity for developing student organizations, Models 1 and 3 use Full-Time
Enrollment, while Models 2 and 4 use Resources.
Table 2.5: OLS Regression Models Predicting Student Impact on Chapter Strength

Student Ideology
LSAT Median

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.54*
(0.22)
0.12***
(0.02)

0.59*
(0.22)
0.12***
(0.02)

0.44*
(0.22)

0.50*
(0.22)

0.57***
(0.09)
0.00
(0.00)

0.53***
(0.09)

Entrance Scores
Full-Time Enrollment

0.00
(0.00)

Resources

0.21*
0.24*
(0.10)
(0.10)
Public
-0.00
-0.01
-0.06
-0.06
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.15)
Observations
93
93
93
93
Adjusted R2
0.4610
0.4708
0.4516
0.4649
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 evaluate H1 and H3.

The results indicate that student ideology is an important driver of Chapter Strength. In
all four models, Student Ideology is significant at p<0.05, and in all four the coefficient is
positive. These results support H1, that Federalist Society Chapter Strength is greater when a law
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school has more conservative students. This is noteworthy given that ideology is significant even
in the presence of some important controls. In all four models, the measure of student quality is
also positive and significant and, in each model, the measure of student quality is significant at
p=0.001 regardless of whether LSATMedian or Entrance Scores is used. In Models 2 and 4, the
control variable Resources has a positive and statistically significant effect on Chapter Strength,
indicating that law schools with more resources may have greater Chapter Strength. On the other
hand, Full-Time Enrollment falls short of statistical significance in Models 1 and 3. Across all
four models, Public falls short of significance, suggesting that whether a law school is public or
private may not influence Chapter Strength.
Figure 2.3 graphs predictions for Chapter Strength at the full range of values for Student
Ideology and LSATMedian based on Model 2. The left panel graphs the influence of Student
Ideology, while the right panel graphs the influence of LSATMedian. The relationship between
Student Ideology and Chapter Strength merits illustration. At the median value for Student
Ideology, -0.5535, a law school’s Federalist Society student chapter is predicted to have a
Chapter Strength of 0.009, which would make its chapter the 33rd strongest in the dataset. If an
otherwise identical law school had a Student Ideology score of -0.118 (the 90 th percentile in terms
of conservatism), it would be predicted to have a Chapter Strength of 0.265. This law school’s
Federalist Society student chapter would be ranked 24th in terms of Chapter Strength.
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Figure 2.3: Student Impact: Influence of Student Ideology and Student Quality on
Federalist Society Student Chapter Strength

Figure 2.3 graphs the predicted effect of Student Ideology (H1) and student quality (H3) on
Chapter Strength based on Model 2. Model 2 uses LSATMedian as the measure of student
quality. Both graphs include predictions for the full range of values of Student Ideology and
LSATMedian at law schools ranked in the top 100 according to the 2021 US News rankings.

The graph in the right panel of Figure 2.3 provides support for the hypothesis that law
schools with more efficacious students will have greater Chapter Strength (H3). Among the law
schools in this dataset, the median LSATMedian is 161. A law school with a LSATMedian of 161
is predicted to have a Chapter Strength of -0.01, which would make its Federalist Society student
chapter the 34th strongest. If an otherwise identical law school had an LSATMedian of 169 (90th
percentile among law schools in the dataset), it would be predicted to have a Chapter Strength of
0.91, which would make its Federalist Society student chapter the 15 th strongest.
Overall, I find strong support for the hypothesis that law schools with more conservative
alumni will have stronger Federalist Society student chapters (H1) and that law schools with more
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efficacious students will also have stronger student chapters (H3). These results have important
implications for social movements, as they suggest that even in the case of an ideologically
oriented organization such at the Federalist Society, the aptitude of an organization’s members at
the grassroots level plays an important role in generating organizational strength.
Professor Impact
Table 2.6 reports four OLS regression models to evaluate the hypotheses that Chapter
Strength will be greater when law schools have more conservative professors (H2) and when they
have more efficacious professors (H4). In Models 5 and 6, the indicator for professor ideology is
Professor IdeologyMean, while in Models 7 and 8 the indicator for professor ideology is Professor
IdeologyP75. To control for a law school’s capacity for developing student organizations, Models
5 and 7 use Full-Time Enrollment while Models 6 and 8 use Resources. Measures of professor
ideology are significant at p=0.001 across all four models, as is Professor Quality.
Table 2.6: OLS Regression Models Predicting Professor Impact on Chapter Strength

Professor IdeologyMean

Model 5

Model 6

0.79**
(0.23)

0.81**
(0.23)

Professor IdeologyP75
Professor Quality
Full-Time Enrollment

0.63***
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)

0.59***
(0.09)

Resources

Model 7

Model 8

0.55***
(0.13)
0.64***
(0.08)
0.00*
(0.00)

0.57***
(0.13)
0.60***
(0.09)

0.20*
0.21*
(0.09)
(0.09)
Public
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.1504)
(0.15)
Observations
90
90
90
90
Adjusted R2
0.5136
0.5185
0.5404
0.5468
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 evaluate H2 and H4.
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In Models 5 and 6, Professor IdeologyMean is a positive and significant predictor of
Chapter Strength at p=0.001 while, in Models 7 and 8, Professor IdeologyP75 is positive and
significant at p=0.000. These results support for the hypothesis that Chapter Strength will be
greater at law schools with more conservative professors (H2). Meanwhile, Professor Quality is
positive and significant at p=0.000 in all four models, providing strong support for H4. As was
the case when evaluating the influence of law students at the grassroots level, this analysis
suggests that law schools’ Resources positively influences Chapter Strength, but that Full-Time
Enrollment and whether the law school is public or private do not.
Figure 2.4 graphs the results from Model 6. The left panel graphs the effect of Professor
IdeologyMean on Chapter Strength (H2). As with the grassroot-centered hypotheses involving
students, the impact of professor (elite) ideology and professor quality merits some exploration. A
law school whose mean professor ideology is the median value of -0.9366 is predicted to have a
Chapter Strength value of -0.009, which would make its Federalist Society student chapter the
33rd strongest. At the 90th percentile for CFscore, the prediction is 0.387. This chapter would be
the 23rd strongest.

41

Figure 2.4: Professor Impact: Influence of Professor Ideology and Professor Quality on
Federalist Society Student Chapter Strength

Figure 2.4 graphs the predicted effect of Professor IdeologyMean (H1) and Professor Quality (H3)
on Chapter Strength based on Model 6. Both graphs include predictions for the full range of
values of Professor IdeologyMean and Professor Quality at law schools ranked in the top 100
according to the 2021 US News rankings.

The right panel of Figure 2.4 graphs the effect of Professor Quality on Chapter Strength
(H4). A law school whose professors are at the median value of Professor Quality for the dataset
is predicted to have a Chapter Strength value of -0.077, which would make the chapter the 38th
strongest. An increase to the 90th percentile in Professor Quality predicts Chapter Strength of
0.834. This would make the law school’s Federalist Society student chapter the 15 th strongest
overall.
Overall, Models 5 through 8 provide strong support for H2 and H4. They also indicate
that, as is the case at the grassroots level (e.g. law students), the aptitude of elites (in this case,
law professors) plays an important role in influencing Chapter Strength. Furthermore, as was the
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case with the previous analysis of the impact of law students, the efficacy of law professors
appears to have a greater impact on Chapter Strength than does the average ideology of the law
school’s professors. One potential criticism of this finding is that the impact of the ideology of
conservative professors is downplayed in Model 6 because it relies on mean CFscores for a law
school rather than on an indicator for the ideologies of the law school’s more conservative
professors. However, analysis of the impact of school’s Professor IdeologyP75 (not shown) in
Model 7 and Model 8 produce the same results: professor efficacy appears to matter more than
ideology, whether Professor IdeologyP75 or Professor IdeologyMean is used.
Grievance Impact
Table 2.7 reports OLS regression models evaluating the influence of conservative
professors’ ideological grievance—both with respect to alumni of their law school and with
respect to their law professor at their own institution—on Chapter Strength. The results provide
strong support for the hypotheses that as the ideological gap between a law school’s conservative
faculty and the law school’s average almuni increases, Chapter Strength increases (H5), and that
as the ideological gap between a law school’s conservative faculty and the law school’s average
professor increases, Chapter Strength increases (H6).
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Table 2.7: OLS Regression Models Predicting Impact of Conservative Professors’
Ideological Grievance on Chapter Strength

Ideological
ConflictStudents
Ideological
ConflictProfessors
Professor Quality
Full-Time Enrollment

Model 9

Model 10

0.53**
(0.19)

0.52**
(0.19)

0.62***
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)

0.61***
(0.09)

Model 11

Model 12

0.87**
(0.25)
0.64***
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)

0.90**
(0.25)
0.61***
(0.09)

Resources

0.11
0.16
(0.09)
(0.09)
Public
-0.03
-0.03
-0.01
-0.00
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.15)
Observations
85
84
90
89
2
Adjusted R
0.5443
0.5398
0.5163
0.5226
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Models 9 and 10 evaluate H5, while Models 11 and 12 evaluate H6.

Figure 2.5 graphs predictions for the influence of a law school’s relatively conservative
professors’ ideological conflict with the law school’s mean Student Ideology on Chapter
Strength, based on Model 10. In the graph, higher values for Ideological ConflictStudents indicate
that conservative professors are more conservative than the law school’s mean alum, whereas
negative values indicate that conservative professors are less conservative than the law school’s
mean alum. A law school with an Ideological ConflictStudents value at the median for all law
schools (0.13475) is predicted to have a Chapter Strength value of .062, which would make its
student chapter the 30th strongest. At the 90th percentile for Ideological ConflictStudent, a law school
is predicted to have a Chapter Strength value of 0.331. This law school’s chapter would be
ranked 23rd in Chapter Strength. The results support the hypothesis that when a law school’s
conservative professors are more ideologically distant from the law school’s average alum,
Chapter Strength should be greater (H5).
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Figure 2.5: Grievance Impact: Effect of Conservative Professors’ Ideological Conflict with
Law School Alumni on Federalist Society Student Chapter Strength

Figure 2.5 graphs the predicted effect of Ideological Conflict (ProfessorIdeologyP75-StudentIdeologyMean) (H5)
on Chapter Strength based on Model 10. The graph includes predictions for the full range of
values of Ideological Conflict (ProfessorIdeologyP75-StudentIdeologyMean) at law schools ranked in the top 100
according to the 2021 US News rankings.

Figure 2.6 graphs predictions for the influence of a law school’s relatively conservative
professors’ ideological conflict with the law school’s average professor on Chapter Strength,
based on Model 12. When a law school has the median value for Ideological ConflictProfessors, it is
predicted to have a Chapter Strength of -0.014 (33rd overall). When an otherwise identical law
school has a value for at the 90th percentile, it is predicted to have a Chapter Strength of 0.371
(23rd overall). These results support the hypotheses that Chapter Strength should be greater when
a law school’s conservative professors are more ideologically distant from the law school’s mean
professor (H6).
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Figure 2.6: Grievance Impact: Effect of Conservative Professors’ Ideological Conflict with
Average Law Professor Peer on Federalist Society Student Chapter Strength

Figure 2.6 graphs the predicted effect of Ideological Conflict ( ProfessorIdeologyP75-ProfessorIdeologyMean) (H6)
on Chapter Strength based on Model 12. The graph includes predictions for the full range of
values of Ideological Conflict (ProfessorIdeologyP75-ProfessorIdeologyMean) at law schools ranked in the top 100
according to the 2021 US News rankings.

Overall, the ideological grievance of a law school’s conservative faculty predict Chapter
Strength, and two forms of ideological grievance impact Chapter Strength. The ideological
grievances of conservative faculty with respect the ideology of the law school’s students matter,
as do their ideological grievances with respect to the rest of the law school’s professors. Although
both of these forms of ideological grievance matter, I refrain from making any claims about
which form of ideological grievance is the stronger driver of Chapter Strength. While the
predicted Chapter Strength for a law school at the 90th percentile for Ideological ConflictProfessors is
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slightly higher than the predicted Chapter Strength for a law school at the 90th percentile for
Ideological ConflictStudent, the difference is small and, in both cases, ideological grievance at the
90th percentile predicts a value of Chapter Strength that would rank as 23rd strongest overall.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results of this study indicate that both law students and professors play important
roles in the development of strong Federalist Society student chapters at law schools. Law
schools have greater Chapter Strength when they have more conservative students (H1) and when
they have more efficacious students (H3). Likewise, Chapter Strength is greater when a law
school has more conservative professors (H2) and when it has more efficacious professors (H4).
Finally, ideological conflict matters, too: Chapter Strength is greater when a law school’s
conservative professors are more ideologically distant from the law school’s mean alum (H5) and
when a law school’s conservative professors are more ideologically distant from the law school’s
mean professor (H6). Moreover, the results hold under multiple model specifications. These
findings are important to both the field of US judicial politics and to the US legal field because
the Federalist Society plays an important role in the judicial branch both now and for the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, this study provides the first-ever systematic quantitative
assessment of the strength of law school’s Federalist Society student chapters, as well as the
sources of Chapter Strength.
But this study makes several other important contributions. First, it provides an original
dataset on law schools’ Federalist Society student chapters. This is important for the field of
judicial politics because of how influential the Federalist Society has become within the US
judicial system, but the value of this dataset is interdisciplinary because it will be of interest to the
legal field and to sociologists interested in social movements. Second, this study is the first to
evaluate the organizational strength of any type of law school student organization, or to assess
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the impact of student ideology, student efficacy, professor ideology, or professor efficacy on
organizational strength.
Third, and most importantly, this study contributes to the academic discussion of the role
of grassroots vs. elite actors in social movements. These findings suggest that both grassroots
members (in this case, law students) and elite actors (law professors) influence the strength of a
SMO. These findings are particularly instructive because rather than assessing how grassroots
members of an organization and the organization’s elites influence organizational strength, I have
effectively assessed the sources of organizational strength at over 80 organizations (totals
observations vary from 84 to 90, depending on the model and data availability). This gives the
findings greater weight as the results are aggregated across all chapters, rather than reflecting the
particular idiosyncrasies of one specific student chapter.
Finally, these findings will be instructive to social movement organizations and their
leaders, as the results highlight the important role of SMO organizers’ aptitudes, whether at the
grassroots level or at the elite level, even in the context of an ideologically driven SMO. If even a
highly conservative SMO such as a Federalist Society student chapter relies more on the aptitudes
of its members than on the ideologies of its members, then SMOs should focus on recruiting
high-quality grassroots members and elite allies, rather than focusing exclusively or primarily on
recruiting ideologically aligned members.
While this study’s contributions are numerous, there is much yet to learn. Future research
could evaluate whether different Federalist Society student chapters have different priorities in
terms of the types of policies they emphasize through their events. A second avenue of research
might assess whether stronger Federalist Society student chapters provide students with better
employment opportunities for law school graduates. Finally, future research could provide nuance
to our understanding of the role that students and professors play in generating organizational
strength at law schools or graduate schools by applying similar methods to other types of
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organizations. While this study is by no means the last word on the sources of SMO strength, it
provides important insights into how organizational strength is influenced by the ideologies and
aptitudes of grassroots organizers and elite allies.
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Chapter Three:
The Federalist Society’s Relationship with the Principles of Federalism and States’ Rights
What distinguishes the voting behavior of Federalist Society members from that of other
Republican-nominated justices? The network’s official website describes it as a group of
conservatives and libertarians focused on the promotion of legal principles such as the separation
of powers, federalism, limited government, and the rule of law. Members and allies of the
network often claim to have a jurisprudence focused on the “original public meaning” of the text
of the US Constitution and argue that their mode of constitutional interpretation is the “correct”
method (see Lawson 2012; Lawson 2013; Paulsen 2014). On the other hand, critics of the
“original public meaning” approach to adjudication claim that it is “little more than a lawyer's
version of a magician's parlor trick” (Cornell 2008) or, worse, “an ideal smokescreen behind
which judges may pursue their personal moral, political, or economic goals with relative
impunity” (Redish and Arnould 2011). Taking aim at the tension between ideological voting and
legal principles, this study addresses the central question of whether Federalist Society members
on the Supreme Court sincere and principled supporters of states’ rights or whether, as critics
suggest, that legal principle is a smokescreen behind which Federalist Society members hide their
ideological goals that are more conservative.
I begin with a brief overview of the jurisprudential philosophy espoused by Federalist
Society members. Then, after examining the very limited quantitative research on the behavior of
Federalist Society members in the federal court system, I discuss two competing explanations for
Federalist Society members’ especially conservative behavior: first, their behavior might reflect
ideology and group polarization; and second—as Federalist Society members would argue—their
behavior might be the result of their sincere adherence to legal principles.
I find support for the hypothesis based on the theory of group polarization: Federalist
Society members vote especially conservative on cases involving core policy issues for the
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network. They also vote more conservatively than their Republican-nominated peers, even after
controlling for ideology, when one of the parties in a case is a state government—which fits with
both the ideological and “sincere federalism” explanations for their behavior. However, in two
key tests of their behavior when ideology and a preference for states’ rights come into conflict, a
Federalist Society member is substantially more likely to cast an anti-state vote than is an
ideologically identical Republican-nominated justice. These results undermine the notion that
justices from the Federalist Society sincerely apply the principles of federalism and states’ rights.
This study makes several important contributions. First, it offers the first systematic
quantitative analysis of the voting behavior of Federalist Society members on the Supreme Court,
which is particularly important given that Federalist Society members now hold a dominant role
on the Supreme Court and can be expected to hold a majority of Supreme Court seats for the
foreseeable future. Second, it has implications for the ongoing debate over whether Federalist
Society members are sincere supporters of the legal principles they purport to hold. This is
particularly important because Federalist Society members now play a central role in Supreme
Court decision-making. And third, it has implications for public confidence in the judicial system
and its broader legitimacy because sincere versus strategic behavior is an important factor
shaping public support for the courts.
The Federalist Society and Jurisprudence
In terms of judicial decision-making, Federalist Society members generally espouse
adherence to “originalism” and typically support one of two approaches to originalism: “original
intent theory” or “original meaning theory.” Original intent theory holds that judges should
interpret the constitution in a manner consistent with what was intended by those who drafted it,
while original meaning theory holds that judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner
consistent with how reasonable persons living at the time the Constitution was adopted would
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have understood the original meaning of the text. Most originalists—including Clarence Thomas,
Amy Coney Barrett, and the late Antonin Scalia—favor the original meaning theory.
There are several other legal principles to which the Federalist Society and its members
generally claim to adhere. On the network’s official website, the “About Us” section
(https://fedsoc.org/about-us) claims, under the “Our Purpose” header, that the organization
believes in certain legal principles, among which are “separation of powers; federalism; limited,
constitutional government; and the rule of law in protecting individual freedom and traditional
values.” (“About Us,” 2021).
In addition to espousing these legal principles, the Federalist Society website also makes
several claims about the legal field and the Federalist Society’s purpose within the legal field.
First, it argues that the legal field is dominated by liberals, and that liberals prefer a centralized
and uniform society. Second, it describes itself as a group of conservatives and libertarians. And
third, it claims to be focused on promoting both the awareness of the legal principles mentioned
above and the application of them in practice (“About Us,” 2021).
Two important inferences can be made based on what the Federalist Society says about
itself. First, the organization’s claims about liberals imply that conservatives and libertarians
prefer a decentralized and heterogenous society. And second, its focus on federalism—which
refers to the distribution of power between the federal government and state government—
combined with its apparent preference for decentralization implies support for states’ rights rather
than allowing the federal government to dictate uniform legal policy across all 50 states.
While the connection between conservative and libertarian ideologies, decentralization,
federalism, and states’ rights is not fully explicit on the organization’s website, the inference of
this link is not only logical but also supported by the types of attorneys and professors who
frequently act as invited speakers to Federalist Society events. For example, libertarian law
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professor Randy E. Barnett, who has written extensively in support of the original meaning theory
of constitutional interpretation, federalism, and states’ rights, has participated as a speaker in over
80 Federalist Society events since 2010.
While many Federalist Society professors, judges, activists, and attorneys are deeply
involved in sharing politically relevant legal knowledge with conservative law school students to
help them promote conservative policies, the training of young conservative attorneys is just one
facet of the network’s influence in the US legal system. Members have played important roles in
numerous important Supreme Court cases as litigants and through the filing of amicus curiae
briefs. For example, vice president of the Cato Institute Ilya Shapiro spoke at 26 Federalist
Society events in 2020 alone and has filed more than 400 amicus curiae briefs before the
Supreme Court in his career. Perhaps most significantly, the network—and especially the
organization’s co-chairman and former Executive Vice President, Leonard Leo—has acted as
gatekeeper in the selection of Republican Supreme Court justices for the last two decades
(O’Harrow and Boburg 2019; Zelizer 2018). Although the Federalist Society as an organization
appears to have legal preferences that should make their members who are judges behave
distinctly from other judges on cases involving states’ rights and despite the network’s dominant
position on the Supreme Court, systematic quantitative analysis of the behavior of Federalist
Society members is sparse.
Research on the Federalist Society
Legal scholars provide some insight on the history and goals of the Federalist Society, as
well as the activities of the more influential members of the organization. For example, Teles
(2008) provides a comprehensive biographical history of the network, including numerous
interviews from key members. In another biographical account of the network, Avery and
McLaughlin (2013) provide both an overview of their history and, importantly, a more
comprehensive discussion of the policy issues in which key members of the Federalist Society
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have been deeply involved. Specifically, Avery and McLaughlin (2013) identify opposition to
affirmative action, opposition to limitations on campaign spending, opposition to sex
discrimination cases, and several other policy issues as important for the Federalist Society. Their
account is crucial for the analysis of whether Federalist Society members’ behavior reflects group
polarization or fidelity to their principles of federalism and states’ rights, as I draw, in large part,
from their discussion of the Federalist Society and its members’ involvement in court cases and
other activities to identify the “core issues” the network cares most about.
Hollis-Brusky (2015) introduces the concept of the Political Epistemic Network (PEN),
and argues convincingly that the Federalist Society is, first and foremost, a network whose
purpose is to share politically relevant legal knowledge among its conservative and libertarian
attorneys and judges. And, as we shall see, there are certain policy issues that members of the
organization have prioritized as important conservative policy issues about which to share
politically relevant legal knowledge.
Although six of the nine seats on the Supreme Court are now occupied by members of the
Federalist Society, there is surprisingly little quantitative research on the behavior of Federalist
Society members. One exception, Scherer and Miller (2009), shows that Federalist Society
members on the U.S. Circuit Courts vote more conservatively than do other Republicannominated judges in cases involving searches and seizures and states’ rights. While this study is
vital for understanding the organization, the dearth of research is remarkable given the
organization’s prominent place in American politics. To date, there is almost no systematic
analysis of the behavior of Federalist Society judges at the District Court level of the federal
judiciary, at the Supreme Court, or at any level of any state court system. Thus, we have almost
no understanding of whether the legal principles espoused by Federalist Society members match
their voting behavior.
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The Voting Behavior of Federalist Society Justices
I evaluate two competing explanations for why Federalist Society members vote more
conservatively than their Republican-nominated peers. The first explanation centers on group
polarization, which might lead Federalist Society members to vote more conservatively than their
Republican-nominated peers on cases involving core policy issues for the Federalist Society. The
second explanation focuses on legal principles. While liberal court observers argue that Federalist
Society members use legal principles as a smokescreen for their conservative policy goals,
Federalist Society members claim that their behavior is driven by sincerely held legal principles.
If Federalist Society members are right, Federalist Society members’ prioritization of legal
principle should lead them to be more likely than their Republican-nominated peers to vote in
favor of the state’s position when voting in favor of a state government’s position requires them
to cast a liberal vote. On the other hand, if liberal court observers are right, then Federalist
Society members may be no more likely than their Republican-nominated peers to cast pro-state
votes when doing so requires them to cast a liberal vote.
Group Polarization.
Research in social and political psychology defines group polarization as the tendency for
members of a homogenous deliberating group to move toward a more extreme position in the
direction of members’ individual preferences (Sunstein 2002). Researchers have examined group
polarization in a variety of contexts. The effects of group discussion on attitudes, judgements,
jury decisions, perceptions of individuals, and ethical decisions are generally consistent with the
theory of group polarization (see Myers and Lamm 1976). Notably, the presence of like-minded
individuals who share a preference for one side of an issue is the crucial antecedent for group
polarization to occur (Baron 2005).
Group polarization is thought to work through three mechanisms: motivated reasoning,
the influence of persuasive arguments, and social comparison (Vinokur and Burnstein 1978;
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Strandberg et al. 2019). First, humans are goal-oriented in their information processing, and they
tend to evaluate information with a bias towards reinforcing their preexisting views (Taber and
Lodge 2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). The second mechanism—the influence of persuasive
arguments—is the process by which individual members of a group hear the arguments proposed
by other members and adjust their positions to reflect the most convincing arguments presented
by other members (Isenberg 1986) Importantly, in the context of a relatively homogenous group,
strong arguments that conflict with individuals’ preexisting views are not only discounted due to
motivated reasoning but are also outnumbered by arguments that support their preexisting views
(Vinokur and Burnstein 1978; Sunstein 2009). Finally, social comparison is the process by which
members, after hearing what other members of the group believe, adjust their own position
towards the dominant position in order to be perceived favorably by other group members
(Brauer et al. 1995; Sunstein 2009).
There are several reasons why we should expect the behavior of Federalist Society
members to reflect group polarization. The first mechanism of group polarization—motivated
reasoning—should be activated because Federalist Society members are highly educated and
politically sophisticated, and because people who are politically sophisticated are more inclined
towards motivated reasoning (Tabor and Lodge 2006). The second mechanism of group
polarization—the influence of persuasive arguments—should also be activated because at
Federalist Society events, attendees are likely to hear especially strong legal arguments from
speakers on behalf of conservative policy outcomes. Federalist Society members should be
especially likely to be familiar with strong conservative arguments for what I will call “core
policy issues,” which are the types of policy issues in which Federalist Society members have
been deeply involved as attorneys and activists. The third mechanism of group polarization—
social comparison—should also be activated through the organization’s events, where relatively
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moderate members are likely to update their views such that they are more conservative after
being exposed to the views of other members of the network.
Thus, the characteristics of the members of the network, the network’s ideological
composition, and the events hosted by the network all suggest that its members should be
susceptible to the process of group polarization. And I expect that because of the process of group
polarization, Federalist Society members will be especially likely to vote conservatively on cases
that involve core policy issues.
H1 – Group polarization and ideological voting: Federalist Society members will be
much more likely to vote conservatively on core policy issues.
While finding support for H1 would not provide sufficient evidence for the group
polarization argument, it does establish a necessary condition for that argument. And further
evidence will be gathered from some of the remaining hypotheses.
Federalism and States’ Rights.
The support of states’ rights is traditionally considered a conservative position (Sullivan
2006). Thus, if Federalist Society members are especially strong proponents of states’ rights
relative to their Republican-nominated peers, then they should also be expected to vote more
conservatively than their peers. While the Federalist Society’s does not explicitly claim to support
states’ rights, that support can be inferred based on what is said in the “About Us” section of their
website. They claim that the liberal legal orthodoxy prefers a centralized and homogenous
society, implying that, as conservatives and libertarians, they prefer a decentralized and
homogenous society. They also claim to support a “limited, constitutional government” and
federalism. Taken together, these facts imply that Federalist Society members generally support
states’ rights since federalism refers to the distribution of power between the federal government
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and states. Furthermore, it also implies that granting states more authority to determine their own
legal and public policies would promote greater policy decentralization and heterogeneity.
Evidence of the organization’s support for states’ rights can be found in the fact that the
libertarian law professor Randy E. Barnett, who literally wrote the book on original meaning
theory (Barnett 2004) and who is an outspoken advocate for federalism and states’ rights, has
been an invited guest speaker at over 80 Federalist Society events since 2010. Because support
for states’ rights has traditionally been considered a conservative view and because, based on how
the Federalist Society characterizes itself on its official website, I hypothesize that Federalist
Society members should vote more conservatively than their Republican-nominated peers on
cases in which one party is a state.
H2 – Federalism and conservative voting: Federalist Society members will vote more
conservatively than other Republican-nominated justices in cases in which one party is a
state.
It is important to note that for the principles of federalism and states’ rights to explain the
especially conservative behavior of justices from the Federalist Society, it must be true that they
not only vote more conservatively on cases in which one party is a state, but that they are also
more likely to vote in favor of the state’s position in these cases. If they are more likely than their
Republican-nominated peers to vote conservatively but not more likely to vote in favor of the
state’s position, then this outcome would suggest that Federalist Society members use state
involvement in a case as a strategic means by which to justify a conservative outcome rather than
indicating that they truly prioritize federalism and states’ rights. Whether Federalist Society
members’ especially conservative voting behavior reflects a genuine prioritization of federalism
and states’ rights has been the subject of speculation, but that question has not yet been the
subject of a definitive systematic analysis. While the Federalist Society claims to adhere to the
principle of federalism and while there is a clear link between federalism, the preference for
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decentralization, and states’ rights, liberal court observers have often questioned “how
suspiciously convenient it is that the jurisprudence advocated by society members so often yields
conservative results” and claim that “conservatives reverse-engineered their preferred
methodologies of interpreting the Constitution and legal statutes to reach the ends they want”
(Montgomery 2019). Other critics suggest that while Federalist Society members typically
espouse interpreting the US Constitution based on the “original meaning” of the text,
“conservatives are typically not so intent on following 'original meaning' in areas such as
affirmative action, executive powers, free speech and federalism” (Levin, DiSalvo, and Shapiro
2012).
I evaluate these competing views: on one hand, that Federalist Society members vote
especially conservatively when one of the parties in a Supreme Court case is a state government
and that they prioritize states’ autonomy in these cases; and on the other, that Federalist Society
members vote more conservatively when one party is a state, but not because they are more likely
than their peers to prioritize federalism and states’ rights.
If Federalist Society members are sincere supporters of the principles of federalism and
states’ rights, then they should be more likely than ideologically similar Republican-nominated
justices to vote in favor of the state government regardless of whether they are involved in the
case as the petitioner or the respondent and regardless of whether the lower court decision was
liberal or conservative. More explicitly, they should be more likely than ideologically similar
Republican-nominated peers to vote in favor of the petitioner when the petitioner is a state
government, and to be more likely to vote in favor of the respondent when the respondent is a
state government. And this should be true both when the lower court decision was conservative
(meaning that a vote in favor of the petitioner requires a liberal vote) and when the lower court
decision was liberal (meaning that a vote in favor of the petitioner requires a conservative vote).
This leads to the following hypothesis:
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H3 – Sincere support for the principle of federalism: Regardless of the ideological
direction of the lower court decision, a Federalist Society member is more likely than an
ideologically similar Republican-nominated justice to vote in favor of the petitioner when the
petitioner is a state government and more likely to vote in favor of the respondent when the
respondent is a state government.
If, however, Federalist Society members are strategic supporters of federalism and states’
rights, then their behavior in a case should be contingent upon whether a vote in favor of the state
government requires a liberal or a conservative vote. Evaluating how Federalist Society members
behave when their ideological preferences are aligned with their legal preferences reveals little
about whether they are sincere or strategic supporters of the principles of federalism and states’
rights. For instance, when the lower court decision was conservative and the respondent is a state
government, a vote in favor of the respondent satisfies both their ideological preferences and their
purported legal preferences. Likewise, when the lower court decision was liberal and the
petitioner is a state government, both preferences are fulfilled by a vote in favor of the petitioner.
Testing whether differences in the behavior of Federalist Society members and
ideologically similar Republican-nominated justices is driven by ideological preferences or legal
preferences requires evaluating their behavior when their ideological preferences and their legal
preferences collide such that a pro-state vote requires a liberal vote. A pro-state vote requires a
liberal vote under two circumstances: when the lower court decision was liberal and the
respondent is a state government, and when the lower court decision was conservative and the
petitioner is a state government. If Federalist Society members’ purported support for federalism
and states’ rights is strategic rather than sincere, then they will not be more likely than
ideologically similar Republican-nominated justices to vote in favor of the state when their
ideological and legal preferences collide. This leads to two hypotheses concerning strategic
behavior:
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H4a – Strategic support for the principle of federalism: In cases in which the lower court
decision was conservative and the petitioner is a state government, a Federalist Society member
is either less likely or no more likely than an ideologically similar Republican-nominated justice
to cast a pro-state vote in favor of the petitioner.
H4b – Strategic support for the principle of federalism: In cases in which the lower court
decision was liberal and the respondent is a state government, a Federalist Society member is
either less likely or no more likely than an ideologically similar Republican-nominated justice to
cast a pro-state vote in favor of the respondent.
Note that the sincere federalism hypothesis (H3) is mutually exclusive with both H4a and
H4b because the former predicts that Federalist Society members will be more likely to cast prostate votes than will ideologically similar Republican-nominated justices, while the latter two
hypotheses provide the expectation that, under certain circumstances, Federalist Society members
will not be more likely to cast pro-state votes. Determining whether H3 or H4a and H4b are
supported will provide useful insight into the behavior of Federalist Society justices and how they
prioritize legal and ideological concerns relative to other Republican-nominated justices which, in
turn, has important implications for the public perception of judicial legitimacy.
Research Design
I analyze Supreme Court justices who cast votes after the confirmation of Justice Scalia
in 1986. This ensures that when comparing votes, they come from only the time when Federalist
Society members have been on the Court. It also limits the confounding effect of time by not
artificially inflating the number of Republican-nominated justices who are non-Federalist Society
members. Table 3.1 provides the names of all justices who have served on the Court since
Antonin Scalia was confirmed in 1986.
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Table 3.1: Supreme Court Justices since 1986
Federalist Society Members
Antonin Scalia
Clarence Thomas
John Roberts
Samuel Alito
Neil Gorsuch
Brett Kavanaugh
Amy Coney Barrett

Other Republican Nominees
William J. Brennan, Jr.
Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
William Rehnquist
John Paul Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor
Anthony Kennedy
David Souter

Democratic Nominees
Byron White
Thurgood Marshall
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer
Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan

The analysis in this paper consists of two studies due to the nature of the questions asked.
The first and second hypothesis concern the conditions under which Federalist Society members
are more likely than their peers to vote conservatively, and thus the dependent variable indicates
whether the justice voted in a conservative direction (coded as 1) or a liberal direction (coded 0).
H3, H4a, and H4b concern the identity of the party for whom each justice votes. Thus, the
dependent variable used to test these hypotheses indicates whether the justice voted for the
petitioner (coded as 1) or the respondent (coded as 0). Both Study One and Study Two draw from
the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2020), hereafter referred to as the SCDB, using the
justice-centered data. In terms of the data, the major difference between Study One and Study
Two is that Study Two is restricted to cases in which one party is a state.
Study One
The dependent variable Vote Direction is a binary variable indicating whether the justice
voted in a conservative direction (coded as 1) or in a liberal direction (coded as 0). The key
independent variable Federalist Society is binary, coded 1 if the justice is a member of the
Federalist Society and 0 otherwise.
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Core Issue is a binary variable indicating whether a case involved an issue identified as a
core policy issue for the Federalist Society. Core Issue is coded as 1 if the case involves such an
issue, and as 0 otherwise. The issues coded as 1 for Core Issue include abortion, affirmative
action, campaign spending, conservative Christian values, desegregation, searches and seizures,
sex discrimination, the Voting Rights Act of 1965. A Core Issue sometimes includes multiple
issues in the SCDB (e.g., there are different codes for different types of searches and seizures).
Section 1 of Appendix B explains how cases pertaining to a Core Issue were identified and
includes the SCDB issue codes for each Core Issue.
State Involvement is a binary variable coded as 1 if one of the parties in the case is a state
government, and 0 otherwise. Section 1 of Appendix B conveys information about how cases
were coded based on state involvement.
The variable Federalist Society is used in two separate interactions that assess how
Federalist Society members differ in terms of their voting behavior from other Republicannominated justices. The first of these interactions, which tests H1, includes Federalist Society
membership and Core Issue. The second interaction, which evaluates H2, includes Federalist
Society and State Involvement.
In addition to the two interactions used to test H1 and H2, several control variables are
included. To control for each justice’s ideology, I use Martin-Quinn ideology scores lagged by
one year (Martin and Quinn 2002). Because Martin-Quinn scores for a given year are based on
the votes cast in that year, using them to predict votes in the same year introduces circularity—
which can be especially problematic when predicting voting behavior across multiple issues
(Martin and Quinn 2005). Because I am predicting votes across multiple issues, I use MartinQuinn scores lagged by one year to control for ideology. As such, the control variable Ideology

63

for a justice in the 2018 term is the justice’s Martin-Quinn score for the 2017 term 3. Chief Justice
is a binary variable, coded as 1 if the justice is Chief Justice and 0 otherwise. Appointing Year
indicates the year in which the justice joined the Supreme Court. Appointing Party is a binary
variable indicating whether the justice was nominated by a Republican president (coded as 1) or a
Democratic president (coded as 0). Finally, to mitigate the possible influence of ideological
polarization between parties over time, I control for fixed effects of the term of the Supreme
Court.
I use logistic regression models, clustered by justice, to evaluate H1 (Group polarization
and ideological voting) and H2 (Federalism and conservative voting). I cluster by justice because
votes cast by the same justice are not independent observations.
Study One Results:
The results of three clustered logistic regression models predicting the probability that a
justice will cast a conservative vote are shown in Table 3.2. Model 1 includes all justices, while
Model 2 only includes Republican-nominated justices. Model 2 is the primary model of interest
because this study is chiefly concerned with differences in the behavior between Federalist
Society members and other Republican-nominated justices. The Model 3 robustness check
excludes three justices—Justices Brennan, Stevens, Souter—who developed liberal reputations.
Importantly, the results from all three models are largely consistent.

3

Using Segal Cover scores (1989) returns very similar results.
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Table 3.2: Clustered Logistic Regression Model Predicting Conservative Votes
Model 1
All Justices

Model 2
Republicannominated
Justices

Model 3
Republicannominated
Justices,
Excluding
Liberals

Federalist Society

-0.34**
-0.37**
-0.37*
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.18)
Core Issue
-0.36
-0.27
0.09
(0.21)
(0.27)
(0.28)
Federalist Society * Core Issue
1.27***
1.16***
0.79*
(0.23)
(0.30)
(0.31)
State Involvement
-0.04
0.02
0.23
(0.11)
(0.15)
(0.13)
Federalist Society * State
0.78***
0.73***
0.52**
Involvement
(0.13)
(0.16)
(0.15)
Ideology
0.29***
0.30***
0.27***
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.05)
Chief Justice
0.11
0.12
0.10
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
Appointing Year
0.00
0.00
0.01*
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Appointing Party
0.03
(0.09)
Fixed Year Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
36,846
27,354
20,815
Pseudo R2
0.0716
0.0693
0.0412
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent clustered logistic regression coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by justice. Dependent variable is a binary: 1 = justice
casts a conservative vote, 0 otherwise. Models 1, 2, and 3 evaluate H1 and H2.

Because evaluating H1 and H2 relies on the interpretation of interactive terms, which are
notoriously difficult to interpret (Franzese, Kam, and Jamal 2001), I present the results of Model
2 from Table 2 graphically. The left panel of Figure 3.1 provides predictions for conservative
votes for both Federalist Society members and other Republican-nominated justices, both on
cases that involve a Core Issue and on those that do not. The right panel shows the predictions
both when a state is involved in the case, and when no state is involved in the case.
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Figure 3.1: Adjusted Predictions for Voting Behavior Based on Issue and State Involvement

Figure 3.1 graphs predictions for the probability of a conservative vote for Federalist Society
members and other Republican-nominated justices. The left panel reports adjusted predictions
based on whether a case involves a Core Issue for the Federalist Society, and the right panel
reports adjusted predictions based on State Involvement in the case. These results are based on
Model 2 in Table 3.2.

The graphical results in the left panel of Figure 3.1 indicate that in cases involving a Core
Issue, the prediction for the probability of a conservative vote for Federalist Society members is
.71, with and a 95% confidence interval of [.68, .74]. Meanwhile, the predicted probability of a
conservative vote for other Republican-nominated in these cases is .51, with a confidence interval
of [.38, .64].
Figure 3.1 reveals two important points about voting on cases involving a Core Issue.
First, Federalist Society members appear more likely than their Republican-nominated peers to
vote conservatively in cases that involve a Core Issue. Second, while Federalist Society members
are substantially more likely to vote conservatively when a case involves a Core Issue than when
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it does not, the difference in the behavior of other Republican-nominated justices based on the
involvement of a Core Issue is negligible.
The right panel of Figure 3.1 graphs predictions for both groups of justices based on
whether a state is involved in a case. When a state is involved is a case a Federalist Society
member is expected to vote conservatively with a probability of .67 and with a 95% confidence
interval of [.64, .70], while other Republican-nominated justices are expected to vote
conservatively with a probability of .57 and a 95% confidence interval of [.49, .64]. As was the
case with Core Issue, the behavior of Federalist Society members diverges substantially based on
State Involvement, whereas the behavior of other Republican-nominated justices does not.
Figure 3.2 graphs the critical test of the average marginal effect of Federalist Society
membership on casting a conservative vote based on whether a case involves a Core Issue and
State Involvement. The left panel, which graphs the average marginal effect of Federalist Society
membership on cases involving a Core Issue, provides support for H1. For cases involving a Core
Issue, Federalist Society membership predicts a roughly 20% increase in the probability of a
conservative vote relative to other Republican-nominated justices, even after controlling for
justice ideology.
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Federalist Society Membership on Voting Behavior Based on
Issue and State Involvement

Figure 3.2 graphs the average marginal effect of Federalist Society membership on conservative
voting based on whether a case involves a Core Issue (left panel) and based on whether a state is
involved in a case (right panel). These results are based on Model 2 in Table 3.2. The left panel
evaluates H1, while the right panel evaluates H2.

The right panel of Figure 3.2, which graphs the average marginal effect of Federalist
Society membership in cases with and without State Involvement, provides the critical test of H2.
Federalist Society membership predicts a 10% increase in the probability of a conservative vote
relative to other Republican-nominated justices, even after controlling for justice ideology4. Thus,
H2—that Federalist Society members will vote especially conservatively when a state is involved
in a case—is supported. While Federalist Society members are more likely to vote conservatively
when a state is involved in a case, what is not yet known is whether they vote more
conservatively due to ideology or sincerely held legal principles. Study Two will answer this

4

In the robustness check Model 3, included in Section 2 of the Appendix, the results still hold, although
they weaken slightly (p<.07) for cases involving a Core Issue.
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question by examining how Federalist Society members behave when political ideology and legal
principle collide, and a pro-state vote requires a liberal vote.
Study Two
The dependent variable Vote For Petitioner is binary and indicates whether the justice
voted in favor of the petitioner (coded as 1) or the respondent (coded as 0). As before, the key
independent variable is the binary variable Federalist Society. To test H3 and the conditional
hypotheses in H4, Federalist Society is used in a three-way interaction that assesses how
Federalist Society members differ from other Republican-nominated justices in terms of their
voting behavior. This interaction includes Federalist Society, Petitioner Is State Gov, and Status
Quo. Petitioner Is State Gov is a binary variable indicating whether the state government is the
petitioner (coded as 1) or the respondent (coded as 0), while Status Quo indicates whether the
ideological direction of the lower court decision was conservative (coded as 1) or liberal (coded
as 0).5
I include the same variables as in Study One—Core Issue, Ideology, Chief Justice,
Appointing Year, Appointing Party, and fixed effects of term of the Supreme Court—but include
three others as well. Prior research has shown that the resources available to a litigant influence
case outcomes (see Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer 1992; Collins 2004 and 2007). Thus, I use the
coding scheme from Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer (1992), which assigns litigants numerical
values ranging from 1 (for poor individuals) to 10 (US government) to control for the relative
strength of the parties involved. Petitioner Resources is the measure of litigant strength, from 110, assigned to the petitioner in each case. Meanwhile, Respondent Resources is the measure of
the respondent’s strength. Finally, I also include the variable State Ideology, which is drawn from

5

Because cases in which both parties are states are not instructive in terms of evaluating Federalist Society
members’ support for federalism, I exclude the eight Supreme Court cases in the dataset in which both
parties are states.

69

the 2018 update of the Berry et al. (1998) measures of state government ideology. I include this
control variable because the ideology of a state government might influence justices’ likelihood
of voting in favor of the state.
Study Two uses logistic regression models, clustered by justice, to evaluate whether
Federalist Society members’ support for the principles of federalism is sincere (H3) or strategic
(H4a and H4b). While the three-way interaction between Federalist Society, Petitioner Is State
Gov, and Status Quo is more complex than some other possible approaches (such as a two-way
interaction between Federalist Society and State Ideology), the three-way interaction used in this
study is necessary because it provides a more direct and case-specific measure of whether the
position advocated by the state is liberal or conservative. As with Study One, votes are clustered
by justice because votes cast by the same justice are not independent observations. Because each
hypothesis concerns how justices behave in cases in which one party is a state, the analysis is
restricted to cases in which one party is a state government, whereas Study One included all other
cases as well.
Study Two Results
Table 3.3 reports three logistic regression models, clustered by justice, that predict
whether the justice will vote for the petitioner or the respondent. Model 1 includes all justices.
Model 2 only includes Republican-nominated justices and is the primary model of interest. As
with Study One, Model 3 provides a robustness check that excludes Justices Brennan, Stevens,
and Souter.
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Table 3.3: Clustered Logistic Regression Model Predicting Votes in Favor of the Petitioner
Model 1
All Justices

Model 2
Republicannominated
Justices

Model 3
Republicannominated
Justices,
Excluding
Liberals

Federalist Society

0.59***
0.56**
0.61**
(0.13)
(0.18)
(0.22)
Petitioner Is State Gov
-0.89***
-0.91**
-0.67
(0.21)
(0.27)
(0.37)
Federalist Society * Petitioner Is State Gov
0.70*
0.61
0.03
(0.28)
(0.34)
(0.29)
Status Quo
0.50
0.41
-0.12
(0.34)
(0.46)
(0.47)
Federalist Society * Status Quo
-2.40***
-2.24***
-1.64***
(0.37)
(0.50)
(0.47)
Petitioner Is State Gov * Status Quo
-0.14
-0.29
-0.64
(0.22)
(0.27)
(0.36)
Federalist Society * Petitioner Is State Gov
0.34
0.31
0.72
* Status Quo
(0.27)
(0.29)
(0.37)
Core Issue
0.01
0.04
0.12
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.11)
Petitioner Resources
0.08
0.15***
0.20***
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
Respondent Resources
-0.12**
-0.09*
-0.12*
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
State Ideology
0.01**
0.01**
0.01**
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Ideology
0.02*
0.02
-0.07***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Chief Justice
-0.19*
-0.17*
-0.13*
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.06)
Appointing Year
0.00
0.001
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Appointing Party
0.13*
(0.05)
Fixed Year Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
6,792
5,132
3,850
Pseudo R2
0.0910
0.1090
0.1755
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent clustered logistic regression coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by justice. Dependent variable is binary: 1=justice casts a
vote in favor of the petitioner, 0 otherwise. Models 1, 2, and 3 evaluate H3, H4a, and H4b.
The left panel of Figure 3.3 graphs predictions when a state is the petitioner in a case
before the Supreme Court. The predictions for Federalist Society members vary dramatically
based on whether the lower court decision was liberal or conservative. When the lower court
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decision was liberal—and thus Federalist Society members’ ideological and legal preferences are
aligned—Federalist Society members are predicted to cast conservative, pro-state votes in favor
of the petitioner with a probability of .73 and a 95% confidence interval of [.67, .80]. But when
the lower court decision was conservative and the petitioner is a state government, the predicted
probability of a liberal, pro-state vote in favor of the petitioner falls to .36, with 95% confidence
interval of [.25, .47]. In other words, when the petitioner is a state government and the ideological
and legal preferences of Federalist Society members collide such that a pro-state vote is a liberal
vote, Federalist Society members are expected to cast anti-state votes 64% of the time.
Figure 3.3: Adjusted Predictions for Voting for Petitioner Based on State Role in Case and
LC Decision Direction

Figure 3.3 graphs predictions for voting in favor of the petitioner for Federalist Society members
and other Republican-nominated justices. The left panel reports adjusted predictions when the
state is the petitioner, and the right panel reports adjusted predictions when the state is the
respondent. These results are based on Model 2 in Table 3.3.
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The right panel of Figure 3.3 reports predictions when a state government is the
respondent. Here again, the ideological direction of the lower court decision plays a much larger
role in influencing the likelihood that Federalist Society members will cast pro-state votes than it
does for other Republican-nominated justices. When the lower court decision was conservative
and the respondent is a state government—and thus Federalist Society members’ ideological and
legal preferences are aligned—the probability of a vote in favor of the petitioner is .42 with a
confidence interval of [.35, .50]. In other words, the probability of a pro-state vote in favor of the
respondent is .58. On the other hand, when Federalist Society members’ ideological and legal
preferences collide and the state is the respondent in a case with a liberal lower court decision,
they are predicted to cast anti-state votes in favor of the petitioner with a probability of .78 and a
95% confidence interval of [.76, .81].
Notably, while the propensity of Federalist Society members to cast pro-state votes
appears largely contingent upon whether the state’s position is liberal or conservative, that is not
the case for other Republican-nominated justices who are not members of the Federalist Society.
Their behavior does not vary substantially based on whether the state’s position is liberal or
conservative.
Figure 3.4, which provides the critical tests of the hypotheses regarding sincere (H3)
versus strategic (H4a and H4b) support for federalism and states’ rights, graphs the average
marginal effect of Federalist Society membership on the likelihood of voting for the petitioner
based on whether a state government is the petitioner or the respondent and whether the lower
court decision was liberal or conservative. The left panel of Figure 3.4 graphs the average
marginal effect of Federalist Society membership in cases with conservative lower court
decisions (meaning that a vote in favor of the respondent is a conservative vote) while the right
panel reports the effect when the lower court decision was liberal (meaning that a vote in favor of
the petitioner is a conservative vote). If Federalist Society members are sincere, then they should
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be more likely than their peers to vote for the petitioner when the petitioner is a state, and more
likely to vote for the respondent when the respondent is a state—and that should be true
regardless of whether the lower court decision was liberal or conservative.
Figure 3.4: Marginal Effect of Federalist Society Membership on Voting for Petitioner
Based on State Role in Case and LC Decision Direction

Figure 3.4 graphs the average marginal effect of Federalist Society membership on a justice’s
propensity to vote in favor of the petitioner based on whether the state is the petitioner or the
respondent and whether the lower court decision was liberal or conservative. These results are
based on Model 2 in Table 3.3. Both panels evaluate H3. The left panel evaluates H4a, while the
right panel evaluates H4b.

As the left panel of Figure 3.4 indicates, Federalist Society members are less likely than
their peers, even after controlling for ideology, to cast liberal votes in favor of the petitioner when
the lower court decision was conservative regardless of the state’s role in the Supreme Court case.
These results undermine H3. For the critical test of H4a, which evaluates the behavior of
Federalist Society members when their ideological and legal preferences collide because the
petitioner is a state government advocating a liberal position, the average marginal effect of
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Federalist Society membership is -.16 with a confidence interval of [-.31, -.01]. This indicates
that Federalist Society members are roughly 16% less likely than their peers to cast pro-state
votes in these cases, even after controlling for ideology. These results support H4a, that Federalist
Society members are no more likely than their peers to cast pro-state votes when the state’s
position is liberal. In fact, Federalist Society members are less likely than their peers to cast prostate votes in these circumstances.
The right panel of Figure 3.4 indicates that Federalist Society members are more likely to
vote in favor of the petitioner when the lower court decision was liberal regardless of the state’s
role in the Supreme Court case, which undermines H3. When the respondent is a state (and thus
Federalist Society members’ ideological and legal preferences collide), the average marginal
effect of Federalist Society membership is .10 with a confidence interval of [.03, .17], indicating
that Federalist Society members are roughly 10% more likely than their peers, even after
controlling for ideology, to cast anti-state votes in favor of the petitioner. These results support
H4b, that Federalist Society members are no more likely than their peers to cast pro-state votes in
favor the respondent when the respondent is a state government advocating a liberal position
before the Court. Here again, they are less likely than their Republican peers to cast pro-state
votes when their ideological and legal preferences collide.
The Model 3 robustness check in which liberal Republican-nominated justices are
excluded also leads to the rejection of H3 while providing additional support for H4a and H4b.
Taken together, the tests for sincere or strategic behavior when ideology and legal principle
collide provide strong support for the strategic account of the behavior of Federalist Society
members and undermine the view that their purported support for federalism and states’ rights is
sincere.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This study offers the first systematic examination of the voting behavior of Federalist
Society members on the Supreme Court. More importantly, it is the first systematic quantitative
examination of whether Federalist Society members are sincerely principled or strategic actors
who use legal principle as the “smokescreen” behind which they pursue ideological goals. First, I
show that Federalist Society members are especially likely to vote conservatively on cases
involving a Core Issue (H1) for the network, and that they are more likely to vote conservatively
in cases with State Involvement (H2). But their behavior does not reflect a sincere preference for
states’ rights (H3). They do vote more conservatively than their peers when a pro-state vote also
implicates a conservative vote. But when ideology and the principles of federalism and states’
rights collide such that a pro-state vote is a liberal vote, Federalist Society members are not more
likely than their peers to vote in favor of the state (H4a and H4b). In fact, they are less likely to
do so. In other words, despite any claims that they are especially strong proponents of federalism
and states’ rights, their support is inconsistent and largely conditional upon whether a pro-state
vote implicates a liberal or conservative vote.
These findings are important because they indicate that Federalist Society members treat
state involvement strategically, and these findings will be concerning to observers of the Court
who are concerned about whether justices make decisions based on legal principles or policy
preferences. These results are also concerning because they show that there are major policy
implications for the Federalist Society’s dominant position in judicial politics on policy issues
such as abortion, affirmative action, campaign spending, sex discrimination, and other salient
political issues.
Although this study makes several important contributions, it only scratches the surface
of what should develop into an important subfield in judicial politics given that Republican
presidents reliably nominate members of the Federalist Society to fill vacancies on the Supreme
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Court even though non-Federalist Society members are nominated by Republican presidents to
the lower federal judiciary. There are numerous avenues of research worth exploring.
While this paper provides the most comprehensive quantitative analysis of the voting
behavior of Federalist Society members to date, it only examines the behavior of Federalist
Society members at the Supreme Court. Although the behavior of Supreme Court justices is
highly consequential, more research on the behavior of judges at lower levels in the federal
judiciary and in the state court system is needed. Evaluating the voting behavior of Federalist
Society members on other courts will be useful because it would test whether Federalist Society
judges behave similarly when they must be concerned about being reviewed by a higher court.
The influence of the Federalist Society on the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process
also deserves attention. Because this paper has shown that Federalist Society members have
especially conservative views on policy issues with which key members have been deeply
involved as advocates, it might be expected that as the number of Federalist Society members on
the Supreme Court increases—and especially when they constitute a majority of justices on the
Supreme Court—the Supreme Court’s docket might change in a way that reflects those
preferences.
While there is much more to learn about the behavior and influence of the Federalist
Society, this paper makes significant inroads into understanding the behavior of Federalist
Society justices on the Supreme Court. It not only identifies core issues for the Federalist Society,
but also systematically designs a test of the behavior of Federalist Society members on those core
issues to evaluate the Federalist Society’s arguments on their face. It thus provides the first
quantitative assessment of how the Federalist Society justices decide cases when their ideological
and purported legal principles collide. Understanding how Federalist Society justices make
decisions as well as the political and legal ramifications of those decisions is vitally important, as
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the Federalist Society has a strong influence on the role of the courts in Americans’ lives and will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
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Chapter Four:
The Influence of the Federalist Society on Support for the Supreme Court
Currently, six of the nine justices of the Supreme Court are (or have been) affiliated with
the Federalist Society. Despite the dominant position now held by members of the network on
the highest court in the United States, there is little quantitative research to date on the Federalist
Society. To my knowledge, no research to date takes aim at the Federalist Society’s influence on
public support for the Court. This study addresses that shortcoming in the literature. In this study,
I ask whether source cues associating members of the majority coalition with the Federalist
Society influence public support for the Court.
Drawing from the literature on source cues and court curbing, I generate several
expectations about citizens’ preferences regarding broadly targeted versus narrowly targeted court
curbing proposals. I test these expectations through a survey experiment, conducted on June 9,
2022, in which respondents were asked to read articles about the then-upcoming Supreme Court
decision in the case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health (2022). Because of the importance of the
case—whose outcome would ultimately overturn the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade (1973)—
and the unprecedented leak of a draft opinion, when the survey experiment was conducted in June
2022, the average American was likely more aware of this case than of any pending case since
Bush v. Gore (2000). As such, this case provides an exceptionally difficult test for the influence
of source cues, as many Americans would have learned about the case and the leaked draft prior
to participation in the survey experiment.
Employing a split-sample analysis because I expect opposite effects of source cues for
liberals and conservatives, I find tentative (but inconclusive) evidence that source cues
associating members of the expected majority coalition with Republicans, the Federalist Society,
or both Republicans and the Federalist Society leads liberals to be more supportive of broadly
targeted court curbing measures. However, there is little evidence that these cues lead
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conservatives to be less supportive of broadly targeted court curbing measures. This is important,
as it suggests an asymmetric effect of source cues that might erode aggregate support for the
Court and increase support for broadly targeted court curbing measures. Surprisingly, these
source cues do not have the predicted effects on support for narrowly targeted court curbing.
Next, I evaluate whether information frames influence individuals’ support for court
curbing. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two informational frames. One frame
emphasized the especially conservative voting behavior of justices associated with the Federalist
Society in abortion cases, while the other provided more general information about the Court’s
recent history on abortion cases. The expectation was that the information frame emphasizing the
especially conservative voting behavior of Federalist Society members in abortion cases would
cause liberals to be more supportive of narrowly targeted court curbing measures, and to reduce
support for these measures among conservatives. The results, however, do not support these
expectations.
One difficulty with the split-sample analysis is that it makes distinguishing the effects of
a respondent’s left-right ideology and ideological polarization impossible, as the two are perfectly
correlated within each sample. In additional analyses, I untangle the effects of these ideological
factors by calculating models that include the full sample of respondents, rather than evaluating
liberals and conservatives separately. In these analyses, I find that, in line with Bartels and
Johnston (2020), general policy disagreement with the Court predicts support for both broadly
targeted court curbing and narrowly targeted court curbing measures. And, like those authors, I
find that specific policy disagreement (in this case, with respect to abortion) predicts support for
narrowly court curbing around the issue of abortion to a much greater extent than it does for
broadly court curbing.
Bartels and Johnston (2020) make important contributions to our understanding of how
individuals evaluate the Court by showing that, contrary to conventional wisdom, individuals’
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ideological preferences do matter. But the additional analyses in this study move beyond those
findings and uncover two other ideological factors that influence support for court curbing
measures in important but nuanced ways.
The most critical of these findings concerns the role that ideological polarization plays in
shaping their support for broadly and narrowly targeted court curbing measures. Respondents
who are highly polarized—whether liberal or conservative—are more likely to support broadly
targeted court curbing measures, and less likely to support narrowly targeted court curbing
measures. Ideological polarization appears to play an especially central role in influencing
support for broadly targeted court curbing measures, as standardized beta weights indicate that a
respondent’s ideological polarization is at least twice as important an influence (with a beta
coefficient of 0.19) on support for broadly targeted court curbing as are general policy
disagreement (0.07) and specific policy disagreement over abortion (0.07). It also appears to be
the case that liberals are somewhat more supportive of both broadly and narrowly targeted court
curbing measures than are conservatives, but that might be due to case factors such as the
expectation, based on the news of the leaked majority opinion draft, that the Court would rule to
overturn Roe v. Wade in the case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health.
These results have important implications for the Court. The Bartels and Johnston (2020)
findings might imply that, in the context of a conservative decision (or a series of conservative
decisions), liberals should be most likely to support broadly targeted court curbing measures and
conservatives should be least likely to do so, with moderates somewhere in between. But that
perspective does not consider the important role that ideological polarization plays in shaping
support for the Court. The results here suggest that support for broadly targeted court curbing
should be lowest among moderates and those who are only somewhat conservative, higher among
the most conservative individuals and those who are only somewhat liberal, and highest among
those who are most liberal. Given the long-term trend towards higher levels of ideological
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polarization among political elites, the findings here point towards a future in which we may see
increased support for broadly targeted court curbing measures from both liberal legislators and
the most conservative legislators.
Research on the Federalist Society
Despite the power Federalist Society members now hold over the Supreme Court,
quantitative research on the network is sparse. We do, however, have some insights about how
the conservative legal movement is different from other social movements, how the network
influences judicial nominations, and how members of the Federalist Society who are judges
behave differently from other Republican-nominated judges.

Hollis-Brusky (2015) offers a way of thinking about the Federalist Society that
distinguishes it from other political networks. She argues that the Federalist Society network is a
political epistemic network (PEN) whose purpose is to spread politically relevant legal
knowledge among conservative attorneys. Tracing the involvement of Federalist Society
members at various positions within the legal field—as litigants, amicus curiae, advocates
presenting arguments before the Supreme Court, law clerks for Supreme Court justices, and as
Supreme Court justices themselves—she goes to great lengths to show how Federalist Societygenerated and promulgated legal arguments reach the Supreme Court. She also identifies some of
the key issues of concern for Federalist Society members.
While Hollis-Brusky (2015) makes the compelling case that the Federalist Society is
indeed a PEN, Bird, King, and McGee (2022) show that it is more than just a PEN. The Federalist
Society network also serves as a high-information partisan cue for US senators when voting on
judicial nominees. Those authors find consistent support for the hypotheses that Republicans are
more likely to support nominees who are affiliated with the Federalist Society, while Democrats
are less likely to support those nominees.
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Two extant studies evaluate the behavior of judges who are members of the Federalist
Society. Federalist Society members on the United States courts of appeals are more conservative
than not only Democrat-nominated judges but also than other Republican-nominated judges
(Scherer and Miller 2009). On the Supreme Court, they also vote more conservatively than other
Republican-nominated justices on certain policy issues for which members of the network have
been deeply involved as advocates, and they are also less likely to cast votes in favor of states’
rights when the state’s position is liberal (see Chapter Three). While researchers have made
important contributions to our understanding of the Federalist Society and its influence, none of
the prior work, to my knowledge, evaluates its influence on public support for the Court.
Source Cues and Support for the Court
Citizens often rely on source cues when making political evaluations. The traditional
view is that do this when they lack high-quality information or well-reasoned beliefs (Popkin
1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). A more recent line of research suggests that cue-taking
reflects the motivation of individuals to support political identities that they value by expressing
views that have been cued to be consistent with support for those political identities (Kahan
2013). While source cues have been studied in a variety of contexts, they have less frequently
been studied in the judicial context. This is likely due to the traditional view that the courts are
“different” and less political than other political institutions.
Several studies in the last decade have, however, fruitfully applied the concept of source
cues to the study of the courts. One key finding relevant to the current study is that source cues
can have a strong effect on the acceptance of a Supreme Court decision, as Democrats are more
likely to support decisions handed down by a Democratic majority while Republicans are more
likely to support decisions handed down by a Republican majority (Nicholson and Hansford
2014). In addition to influencing respondents’ acceptance of individual Supreme Court decisions,
source cues can also influence support for at least some court-curbing measures, such as reducing

83

judges’ tenure from life to 18 years or allowing Congress (or the president) to reverse Supreme
Court decisions (Clark and Kastellec 2015). Likewise, Bartels and Johnston (2020) show that
polarized party cues can strongly influence support for narrowly targeted court curbing measures,
although they suggest that the effect of polarized party cues are a weaker influence on support for
broadly targeted court curbing measures.
While the evidence surrounding the influence of source cues on support for broadly
targeted court curbing measures appears somewhat mixed, with Clark and Kastellec (2015)
finding strong support and Bartels and Johnston (2020) finding tentative support, their findings
are largely consistent with each other. Thus, in the context of this vignette experiment, I expect
that source cues describing the expected majority coalition as either consisting of Republicannominated justices, Federalist Society members, or Republican-nominated justices who are also
Federalist Society members will influence support for broadly targeted court curbing measures.
Specifically, I expect that for liberals, respondents who receive an article describing justices in
the expected majority coalition as having been nominated by Republican presidents, as being
members of the Federalist Society, or both will report higher support for broadly targeted and
narrowly targeted court curbing measures. I expect these cues to have the opposite effect for
conservative respondents.
Coalition Information Hypothesis. When the expected majority coalition of an upcoming
case is described as consisting of Republican-nominated justices, Federalist Society members, or
Republican-nominated justices who are also Federalist Society members, liberals will report
higher levels of support for both broadly targeted and narrowly targeted Supreme Court curbing
measures, while conservatives will report lower levels of support for both broadly targeted and
narrowly targeted Supreme Court curbing measures.
While no study to date has, to my knowledge, evaluated the influence of the Federalist
Society as a source cue for individuals among the public, one study does explore the influence of
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the Federalist Society as an informational cue for US Senators considering judicial nominations
(Bird, King, and McGee 2022). The authors of that study find that US senators use Federalist
Society membership as a high-information partisan cue when evaluating judicial candidates, with
Republicans being more likely to support the nominations of Federalist Society members and
Democrats being less likely to do so.
Does the public treat Federalist Society membership in a similar manner? Or does
Federalist Society membership carry little weight with the average citizen? If a cue provides
respondents with information that is likely to be relevant to a wide array of cases across various
issue areas, then it would likely influence respondents’ support for broadly targeted court curbing
measures. On the other hand, if the cue only provides information that pertains to a narrow subset
of cases the Supreme Court might see, then we should see changes in support for narrowly
targeted court curbing measures, but not for broadly targeted measures. Because the Federalist
Society information frame used in this study focuses on the voting behavior of Federalist Society
members in abortion cases (but not other types of cases), I do not expect the information frame to
influence support for broadly targeted court curbing measures. But I do expect this information
frame to influence respondents’ support for narrowly targeted court curbing measures, with
liberals reporting higher levels of support and conservatives reporting lower levels of support for
such measures.
Federalist Society Information Hypothesis: Liberal respondents who receive the
Federalist Society Information cue will report higher support for narrowly targeted court curbing
measures, while conservative respondents who receive the Federalist Society Information cue will
report lower support for narrowly targeted court curbing measures.
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Policy Disagreement and Support for the Court
The Supreme Court must maintain a reservoir of support for its rulings to have
authoritative force, in part because its power of judicial review has no explicit enforcement
mechanism (Bartels and Johnston 2013). Historically, the public has been more supportive of the
Supreme Court than of the Presidency or Congress (Gibson 2007), and the conventional wisdom
is that individuals’ ideological preferences do not influence their support for the Supreme Court
(Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson 2007). Instead, according to the conventional wisdom,
support for the Court is linked to factors such as individuals’ democratic values (Gibson and
Nelson 2015) and their political knowledge (Gibson and Caldeira 2009).
Another (and more recent) vein of research highlights the role of policy disagreement in
shaping individuals’ views of the Court. Bartels and Johnston (2013) employ a survey experiment
to assess how individuals’ political leanings and their perception of the Court’s ideology
influences their views on the Court’s legitimacy, showing that individuals with subjective
ideological disagreement with the Court report dimmer views of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy.
Christenson and Glick (2015) also find evidence that respondents’ views regarding the legitimacy
of the Court is influenced by their perceived ideological distance from the Court. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, ideological preference do appear to influence individuals’ support for the
Court.
In their important book, Bartels and Johnston (2020) introduce an important conceptual
distinction concerning support for the Court. They note that previous researchers have used a
somewhat muddied concept of “legitimacy” that conflates support for court curbing with
procedural perceptions of judicial legitimacy. Rather than blending those two concepts, the
authors focus squarely on court curbing measures and create a conceptual distinction between
support for broadly targeted court curbing and narrowly targeted court curbing. Support for
broadly targeted court curbing refers to support for measures that would undermine the power of
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justices individually or of the Court as a whole, while support for narrowly targeted court curbing
refers to support for measures that would undermine the power of the Court on a specific policy
issue (or on a few specific policy issues). The authors also distinguish between general and
specific policy disagreement. General policy disagreement refers to the degree to which an
individual feels like they disagree with the Court in general, while specific policy disagreement
refers to whether an individual disagrees with the Court on a specific issue (or a subset of issues).
Bartels and Johnston (2020) show that general policy disagreement influences support for
both broadly targeted and narrowly targeted court curbing measures. They also find that specific
policy disagreement influences support for both types of court curbing, but that its influence is
stronger on support for narrowly targeted court curbing. I draw two expectations from these
findings. First, I expect that respondents with higher levels of general policy disagreement with
the Court be more supportive of both broadly targeted and narrowly targeted forms of court
curbing. And second, I expect that specific policy disagreement will also influence individuals’
support for both broadly targeted and narrowly targeted forms of court curbing.
General Policy Disagreement Hypothesis. Respondents with higher levels of general
policy disagreement with the Court will report higher levels of support for both broadly and
narrowly targeted court curbing measures.
Specific Policy Disagreement Hypothesis. Respondents with higher levels of specific
policy disagreement with the Court will report higher levels of support for both broadly and
narrowly targeted court curbing measures.
Vignette Experiment: Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
To evaluate these hypotheses, I conducted a survey experiment via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (mTurk). Although mTurk samples tend not to be representative (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz
2012) with respondents skewing white and young (Ono and Zilis 2022), various researchers have
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found that mTurk studies produce consistent results that can be replicated across national surveys
(Clifford, Jewell and Waggoner 2015; Mullinix et al. 2015).
The experiment was fielded with a sample of 1,100 participants6. To be eligible for
participation, respondents had to be in the United States, be at least 18 years of age, have
completed at least 500 prior tasks, and have at least 95% of their prior tasks accepted. Following
the recommendation of Kennedy et al. (2020), I ensured that each respondent only completed the
survey once. The survey was conducted on Thursday, June 9, 2022, and respondents were paid
$0.45 to complete the survey.7 The median response time was about 6 minutes and 40 seconds,
with most respondents taking between 4 and 10 minutes to complete the survey.
The embedded experiment presented realistic information about a then-pending case
before the United States Supreme Court—the landmark case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
(2022). At the time that respondents took the survey, a draft of the majority opinion written by
Associate Justice Samuel Alito had been made public more than a month earlier, but the official
announcement of the majority decision was still 15 days away. At the time, it was widely known
that the decision was expected to overturn Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey
(1992), and that the decision would be divided largely along partisan lines, with at least five of
the six conservative justices (all six of whom, again, are Federalist Society affiliates) joining the
majority. At the time it was unclear how Chief Justice John Roberts would vote, although he
ultimate wrote an opinion concurring in judgement. Prior to the leaked draft, Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health was already a highly salient case, but the highly unusual leak of the draft made
substantial national news before the decision was officially made.

6

The University of Kentucky IRB letter of Approval for Exemption Certification is available in Appendix
C.
7
Following Arechar et al. (2017), I avoided conducting the online survey experiment over a weekend or
during an evening. The data was collected on the afternoon of Thursday, June 9, 2022.
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This set of circumstances offers a particularly rigorous test for the influence of source
cues on support for court curbing because the leak was unusual, it made national news, it made
the likely outcome of the case known, and it revealed that the majority coalition would be largely
divided along partisan lines. Given these circumstances, one would expect source cues to have
little impact on respondents’ support for court curbing measures because many respondents
would already know the ideological direction of the outcome and the ideological composition of
the majority coalition. In this context, even modest findings in support of the influence of source
cues would be telling.
In the vignette experiment, respondents answered a series of questions regarding their
personal demographic information, ideology, partisanship, their preferences on abortion policy,
and two other policy issues (both of which were included to avoid signaling that the survey
experiment concerned abortion policy). Respondents were next asked questions evaluating their
political knowledge. Then, they were randomly assigned to a vignette discussing the thenupcoming decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, or to a control group that did not
receive an article
Respondents who received an article were told that court observers “expect that Roe v.
Wade will likely be overturned this year” and that “It is expected that the majority coalition”
either (1) “will consist of moderate, libertarian, and conservative justices.”; (2) “will include only
Republican-nominated justices.”; (3) “will include only justices who are members of the
Federalist Society.”; or (4) “will include only Republican-nominated justices who are members of
the Federalist Society.” Respondents were also randomly assigned to one of two informational
cues providing either (1) general information about the Court’s recent history on abortion cases or
(2) specific information about the ideological orientation of the Federalist Society, the presence of
Federalist Society members on the Supreme Court, and the voting behavior of justices from the
Federalist Society on cases involving abortion. Respondents who were not assigned to the control
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group receive one of the four coalition cues and one of the two informational cues. The text of
the articles is reproduced below, including all four coalition cues and both informational cues:
After hearing oral arguments in December, the US Supreme Court will decide another important
abortion case this year. In this case, the justices will be deciding whether to overturn Roe v. Wade
and allow states to pass more restrictive abortion laws. The Court is currently led by justices that
[Coalition Cue 1: form a coalition of moderates, libertarians, and conservatives./Coalition Cue 2:
were nominated by Republicans./Coalition Cue 3: are members of the Federalist
Society./Coalition Cue 4: were nominated by Republicans and are members of the Federalist
Society.]
[Federalist Society Information Cue: Six of the nine Supreme Court justices are members of the
Federalist Society, which is a network of conservative attorneys and judges. Members of the
Federalist Society typically have very conservative views on abortion./General Information Cue:
Eight of justices have previously heard abortion cases while on the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court’s most recent abortion case was June Medica Services v. Russo, which involved a
Louisiana law. That case was decided in 2020.]
Several of the justices asked tough questions during oral arguments, leading Court observers to
expect that Roe v. Wade will likely be overturned this year. It is expected that [Coalition Cue 1:
the majority coalition will consist of moderate, libertarian, and conservative justices./Coalition
Cue 2: the majority coalition will include only Republican-nominated justices./Coalition Cue 3:
the majority coalition will include only justices who are members of the Federalist
Society./Coalition Cue 4: the majority coalition will include only Republican-nominated justices
who are members of the Federalist Society.]
[Federalist Society Information Cue: Federalist Society members have cast anti-abortion votes
90% of the time in Supreme Court cases involving abortion./General Information Cue: Last
year’s Supreme Court docket did not include any cases involving abortion.] A decision is
expected in June.

Because the Coalition Information treatment has four possible conditions and the
Federalist Society Information treatment has two, there were a total of eight experimental
conditions in addition to the previously discussed control condition in which respondents did not
read an article about Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health. As such, each respondent was randomly
assigned to one of nine conditions.
After reading the vignette, respondents answered two manipulation check questions. The
first of these asked how the article described the composition of the expected majority coalition,
while the second asked respondents to evaluate the ideology of the Federalist Society on a scale
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from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Finally, all respondents were asked a
series of questions about their support for various court curbing measures.
This study uses two dependent variables. The first dependent variable, Broadly Targeted
Court Curbing, is an index of three indicators. These three indicators reflect a respondent’s
support for removing judges who “who consistently make decisions at odds with what a majority
of the people,” reducing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction on “certain types of controversial
issues,” and making the Court “less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people
want.” For each of these items, possible responses ranged from “Strongly disagree” (coded as 0)
to “Strongly agree” (coded as 4). Thus, the dependent variable Broadly Targeted Court Curbing
may take on values from 0 to 12, where 12 is the highest level of support for broadly targeted
court curbing.
The second dependent variable, Narrowly Targeted Court Curbing, is also an index of
three indicators. These indicators reflect an individual’s support for curbing the Court’s power
specifically in cases involving abortion. The first question asked whether the Supreme Court
should be considered the “final word” on abortion. Possible responses range from “Definitely
yes” (coded as 0) to “Definitely no” (coded as 4). The second question asked respondents how
much authority the Supreme Court’s decision should have over the other branches of government
and the American people on the issue of abortion. Responses ranged from “Complete authority”
(coded as 0) to “No authority at all” (coded as 3). Finally, the third question asked respondents
whether they agree with the statement that “All Americans (including elected officials
nationwide) should comply with the Supreme Court's ruling on the issue of abortion.” Responses
ranged from “Strongly agree” (coded as 0) to “Strongly disagree” (coded as 4). The dependent
variable Broadly Targeted Court Curbing ranges from 0 to 11.
There are two key independent variables in this study: Coalition Information (as well as
its collapsed version) and Federalist Society Information. The variable Coalition Information,
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which ranges from 0 to 3, indicates whether the respondent was told that the majority coalition in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health was expected to consist of “moderate, libertarian, and
conservative justices” (coded as 0), “Republican-nominated justices” (coded as 1), “only justices
who are members of the Federalist Society” (coded as 2), or “only Republican-nominated justices
who are members of the Federalist Society” (coded as 3). For the analyses that follow, the control
condition is also coded as 0. Coalition Information is treated as categorical, and I use this variable
to test the Coalition Information Hypothesis. I also created a collapsed version of this variable,
Coalition Information (Collapsed), which is a binary variable in which the Republican cue, the
Federalist Society cue, and the cue that combines both are all coded as 1. As with the previous
version of the variable, the two conditions in which the expected majority coalition is described
as consisting of “moderate, libertarian, and conservative justices” is coded as 0, while the control
group is also coded as 0.
Federalist Society Information is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent
received information about the voting behavior of justices who are members of the Federalist
Society on cases involving abortion (coded as 1) or whether they were given the more general
information (coded as 0). I use this variable to evaluate the Federalist Society Information
Hypothesis.
General Policy Disagreement is measured as the difference between the respondent’s
perception of the Supreme Court’s ideology and the respondent’s perception of their own
ideology. Because scores for both measures range from 1 (“extremely liberal”) to 7 (“extremely
conservative”), these values can theoretically range from -6 (when an “extremely conservative”
respondent views the Supreme Court as “extremely liberal”) to 6 (when an “extremely liberal”
respondent views the Supreme Court as a “extremely conservative”). Thus, negative values for
General Policy Disagreement indicate that the respondent sees the Supreme Court to the
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ideological left of herself, while positive values indicate that the respondent sees the Supreme
Court to the ideological right.
Abortion is a binary variable coded as 0 if a respondent reports the view that by law
abortion should (1) should never be permitted or (2) only be permitted in case of rape, incest, or
when the woman's life is in danger. It is coded as 1 if the respondent reports the view that by law
abortion should (1) be permitted for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life,
but only after the need for abortion has been clearly established or (2) always be permitted as a
matter of personal choice. Because the case involved in this study concerns abortion, Abortion is
also an indicator of specific policy disagreement.
I also include a series of control variables that might be related to support for broadly
targeted or narrowly targeted court curbing measures. I control for the respondent’s left-right
ideology, using the self-reported Ideology measure ranging from 1 (“extremely liberal”) to 7
(“extremely conservative”). Sex is a binary variable coded as 0 if the respondent is male and 1 if
the respondent is female. Race is a binary variable coded as 0 if the respondent is white and 1
otherwise. Age is coded as 1 (if the respondent is 18-25 years old), 2 (26-35 years), 3 (36-45
years), 4 (46-55 years), 5 (56-65) years, or 6 (66 years old or older). Political Knowledge is a
measure of how many questions a respondent answered correctly out of four political knowledge
questions. Values range from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates that the respondent did not answer any
questions correctly and 4 indicates that the respondent answered 4 questions correctly.
One concern when conducting online survey experiments is whether respondents are
paying attention to the information being present or simply “clicking through” to complete the
survey. Two tables in the Appendix allay those concerns. Table C1 in the Appendix reports the
results of a two-sample t- test comparing respondents who received the Federalist Society
Information condition with those who did not. The results indicate that respondents who received
the Federalist Society Information condition reported an average ideology score for the Federalist
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Society of 4.66, while respondents who received the general information reported an average
ideology score of 4.44. Table C2 in the Appendix reports the result of Pearson's chi-squared test,
which indicates that there is a strong relationship between the condition respondents were
assigned to and their responses to question about how the article describes the Federalist Society.
The results provide additional evidence that respondents largely both read and understood how
the article presented the Federalist Society.
Although there is clear evidence of respondents reading and understanding the
information they were given, many respondents—even those in the Federalist Society
Information condition—incorrectly identified the ideology of the Federalist Society. While the
Federalist Society describes itself as a group of conservatives and libertarians (About Us, 2022),
roughly one-third of respondents did not see them that way. It is not clear whether these
respondents were simply wrong, whether they were guessing, or whether they were intentionally
providing inaccurate responses. To account for potential systematic differences between these
respondents who view the Federalist Society as liberal and other respondents, I include the
variable Data Control, which is a control variable indicating that the respondent may not have
answered or honestly (or may simply be wrong). It is coded as 0 if the respondent reported that
the Federalist Society’s ideology is moderate, slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely
conservative, and it is coded as 1 if the respondent reported that the Federalist Society’s ideology
is slightly liberal, liberal, or extremely liberal.
Finally, I create a control variable Attention Control, which is used in additional
robustness checks in the Appendix. Attention Control has three components. The first two
components are binary indicators based on responses to attention check questions that were built
into the survey experiment. These two questions gave respondents specific directions about which
response(s) to select, regardless of their views. For each of these questions, respondents are coded
as 0 if they answered correctly, and 1 if they did not. The third component is a binary indicator
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coded as 0 if the respondent completed the survey in under 15,000 seconds and 1 if the duration
was greater than 1,500 seconds (25 minutes). Attention Control is calculated as the sum of these
three indicators. Technically, these values may range from 0 to 3, but in practice the highest value
is 2 as no respondents answered both attention check questions incorrectly and took longer than
25 minutes to complete the survey. Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the two dependent
variables and the control variables presented in the analysis that follows.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Vignette Experiment
Variable
Broadly Targeted Court Curbing
Narrowly Targeted Court Curbing
Coalition Information
Coalition Information (Collapsed)
Federalist Society Information
Policy Disagreement
Ideology
Abortion
Sex
Race
Age
Political Knowledge
Data Control
Attention Control

Obs.
1074
1073
1072
1072
1072
1073
1073
1070
1069
1072
1074
1074
1074
1074

Mean
7.28
4.06
1.33
0.66
0.44
0.58
3.56
0.50
0.44
0.17
2.96
2.09
0.34
0.14

Std. Dev
3.36
2.95
1.16
0.47
0.50
2.24
1.91
0.50
0.50
0.37
1.31
1.17
0.47
0.40

Min
0
0
0
0
0
-6
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

Max
12
11
3
1
1
6
7
1
1
1
6
4
1
2

Before proceeding with the analysis, several idiosyncrasies about the data are worth
noting. First, this sample skews slightly male (56%) and white (83%, including Latinos who
identify as white), and especially Catholic (39%). Black Americans were under-represented (5%),
as were older respondents (only 4% were aged 66 or older). Respondents also skewed liberal,
with 55% reporting ideology scores of less than 4 and 32% reporting ideology scores of greater
than 4.
Additionally, it is worth noting the distribution of respondents among the Coalition
Information and Federalist Society Information conditions. Recall that respondents were
randomly assigned to one of nine conditions. For the purposes of this study, Coalition
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Information and Federalist Society Information are both coded as 0 when the respondent is in the
control condition, so the group of respondents for whom both are coded as 0 is about twice as
large (241 respondents) as each other group, the rest of which included between 116 and 122
respondents. While some might prefer coding the control condition as missing data for these two
variables, the substantive differences in results produce by models calculated under those
conditions (not shown) are negligible. Table 4.2 provides information on the distribution of
respondents in each condition given the coding procedures for Coalition Information and
Federalist Society Information.
Table 4.2: Distribution of Treatment Conditions

Coalition
Cue

Broad (or control)
Republican
Federalist Society
Both (Fed. & Rep)
Total

Federalist Society Information
No (or control)
Yes
241
119
117
116
118
122
122
117
598
474

Total
360
233
240
239
1074

For both Broadly Targeted Court Curbing and Narrowly Targeted Court Curbing, I
calculate OLS regression models. Because Coalition Information and Federalist Society
Information are expected to influence liberals and conservatives in different ways, I conduct a
split sample analysis. This not only allows for the possibility that liberals and conservatives will
respond to the stimuli differently, but also for the possibility that other factors such as Policy
Disagreement and Ideology might influence support for court curbing among liberals and
conservatives in different ways.
Results
This study leverages a survey experiment conducted after a major news story in which a
draft opinion was leaked to the public prior to the announcement of the official opinion on a
highly salient case. Many respondents already knew the expected outcome of the case and would
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have been aware that the majority coalition would include at least five Republican-nominated
justices, with all three Democrat-nominated justices voting in the minority. This makes a survey
experiment after the leak of the opinion draft in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health an especially
difficult test for the influence of source cues on public support for broadly targeted and narrowly
targeted court curbing measures. I begin by evaluating the hypotheses concerning support for
broadly targeted court curbing and conclude with the hypotheses concerning support for narrowly
targeted court curbing. For each of those two dependent variables, I evaluate liberals and
conservatives separately. For each of the main four sets of analysis—support for broadly targeted
court curbing among (1) liberals and (2) conservatives and support for narrowly targeted court
curbing among (3) liberals and (4) conservatives—the models of central concern are Model 5 and
Model 6. Additional robustness checks based on Model 6 are available in the Appendix.
Broadly Targeted Court Curbing
Table 4.3 reports OLS regression results for the influence of the source cues on support
for broadly targeted court curbing measures among liberals. Model 1 only includes the
experimental conditions and the variable Data Control. Model 2 reports the same model, but with
one difference: in this model, Coalition Information is collapsed into a binary variable coded as 1
if the respondent received a vignette that described the majority coalition as consisting of
Republicans, Federalist Society members, or both, and 0 otherwise. Model 5 reports the full
model including all control variables, while Model 6 reports the full model with the collapsed
Coalition Information variable. Model 4 is identical to Model 6, except that it does not control for
respondent ideology. Likewise, Model 3 excludes the control variable for respondent ideology,
but otherwise reflects Model 5. For each of the models predicting support for broadly targeted
court curbing measures, additional robustness checks based on Model 6 are available in the
Appendix.
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Broadly Targeted Court
Curbing (Liberals)
Model 1
Republican
Federalist S.
Both Cues
All Cues
(Collapsed)
Federalist S.
Information
Policy
Disagreement
Ideology

Model 2

0.53
(0.31)
0.72*
(0.33)
0.55
(0.31)

Model 3

Model 4

0.52
(0.29)
0.63*
(0.31)
0.34
(0.30)
0.59*
(0.25)
0.05
(0.23)

Model 5

Model 6

0.42
(0.29)
0.52
(0.30)
0.33
(0.29)
0.49*
(0.23)
0.00
(0.22)
0.25**
(0.07)

0.42
(0.23)
0.05
-0.01
-0.05
-0.04
(0.23)
(0.22)
(0.22)
(0.22)
0.25**
0.07
0.07
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
-0.93*** -0.94***
(0.17)
(0.17)
Abortion
0.19
0.18
0.33
0.33
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.26)
Sex
0.49*
0.50*
0.53*
0.53*
(0.22)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.26)
Race
-0.29
-0.30
-0.25
-0.25
(0.31)
(0.31)
(0.30)
(0.30)
Age
-0.39*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.40***
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Political
-0.68*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.67***
Knowledge
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Observations
584
584
577
577
577
577
Adjusted R2
0.1058
0.1084
0.2032
0.2050
0.2426
0.2449
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Broadly Targeted Court
Curbing. The models are restricted to liberals, defined as respondents with self-reported ideology
scores of 3 or less. The coefficient and standard error for Data Control are omitted.

The results in Model 1 and Model 2, which include only the experimental conditions and
Data Control provide some tentative support for the Coalition Information Hypothesis. In Model
1, coefficient for the condition in which respondents are told that the majority coalition is
expected to consist of Federalist Society members is positive and significant at p=0.05, while the
Republican cue and the cue describing the expected majority coalition as consisting of
Republican-nominated justices who are also members of the Federalist Society fall just short of
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statistical significance (p=0.09 and p=0.08, respectively). In Model 2, Coalition Information
(Collapsed) is significant at p=0.05, providing additional support for the Coalition Information
Hypothesis that source cues about the majority coalition will influence support for broadly
targeted court curbing measures among liberals, even in a highly salient case such as Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health. Model 3 and Model 4 provide additional support for the Coalition
Information Hypothesis. In Model 3, the coefficient for the Federalist Society cue is positive
(0.63) and significant (p<0.05), while the Republican cue is positive (0.52) and approaches
significance (p<0.10). Surprisingly, the cue associating justices in the expected majority coalition
with both Republicans and the Federalist Society falls short of significance. Model 4 provides
additional support for the Coalition Information Hypothesis, as the coefficient Coalition
Information (Collapsed) is positive (0.49) and significant (p<0.05).
However, in the full models that control for respondent ideology, support is slightly
diminished. In Model 5, the coefficients for the Republican cue, the Federalist Society cue, and
the cue indicating that the coalition will be composed of Republican-nominated justices who are
also members of the Federalist Society all have positive coefficients ranging from 0.33 to 0.52,
suggesting that liberals who receive these cues may be somewhat more supportive of broadly
targeted court curbing measures. Surprisingly, only the Republican condition and the Federalist
Society condition approach significance (p=0.14 and p=0.09, respectively). In Model 6, the
variable Coalition Information (Collapsed) is positively signed with a coefficient of 0.42,
although it falls just short of traditional levels of acceptance (p=0.07). Nonetheless, these results
are important. Even with a relatively small sample of liberals (N= 577 in Model 5 and Model 6),
and in a highly salient case, source cues about the majority coalition exhibit some evidence of
influence over liberals’ support for broadly targeted court curbing measures.
This differences between the models that control for respondent ideology (Model 5 and
Model 6) and those that do not (Model 3 and Model 4) provide important insights about the
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nature of support for broadly targeted court curbing measures, at least among liberals. Model 3
and Model 4 both support the now-mainstream view, most notably advocated in Bartels and
Johnston (2020), that individuals with higher levels of general policy disagreement with the Court
will be more supportive of broadly targeted court curbing measures. However, Model 5 and
Model 6 tell another story. When a respondent’s ideology is controlled for, liberals’ support for
broadly targeted court curbing is driven by how liberal they are, and not by how much they feel
like they disagree with the Court. Moreover, the results in Model 5 and Model 6 indicate that
respondent ideology is a very strong predictor (p<0.001) of support for broadly targeted forms of
court curbing. The negative coefficient for Ideology indicates that liberals are the expected to
report higher support for broadly targeted court curbing measures than are conservatives.
While Model 3 and Model 4 provide tentative support for the General Policy
Disagreement Hypothesis, indicating that liberals with higher levels of General Policy
Disagreement will be more supportive of broadly targeted court curbing measures, the full
models that control for ideology do not. The indicator Abortion, which is a measure of specific
policy disagreement, is not significant in any of the models presented, although the coefficient is
in the expected direction in each model. While the results here are surprising in that, at least
among liberals, general policy disagreement and specific policy disagreement do not appear to
have the expected effects, they also reveal what I believe to be a novel finding—that the
ideological factor that contributes most to support for broadly targeted court curbing appears to be
ideology, not policy disagreement. However, because of the split sample design, it is not yet clear
whether the most extreme liberals are more supportive of broadly targeted court curbing because
they are more liberal, more polarized, or both. Disentangling these influences would require
calculating regression models for the full sample.
Models predicting conservative support for broadly targeted court curbing are reported in
Table 4.4. The results here are surprising. I expected that respondents given the Republican cue,
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the Federalist Society cue, or the cue associating the majority coalition with both Republicans and
the Federalist Society would report lower support for broadly targeted court curbing measures.
While the coefficients for the individual coalition cues were negative as expected with only one
exception (the Federalist Society coalition cue in Model 5), all feel short of traditionally accepted
levels of significance. In Model 3 and Model 5, the cue associating the majority coalition with
both Republicans and the Federalist Society approaches significance, but it falls short of that
threshold in both. Thus, I do not find support for the hypothesis that associating the majority
coalition with Republicans, the Federalist Society, or both will lead conservatives to be less
supportive of broadly targeted court curbing.
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Broadly Targeted Court
Curbing (Conservatives)
Model 1
Republican
Federalist S.
Both Cues
All Cues
(Collapsed)
Federalist S.
Information
Policy
Disagreement
Ideology

Model 2

-0.03
(0.59)
-0.18
(0.55)
-0.65
(0.60)

Model 3

Model 4

-0.17
(0.49)
-0.13
(0.47)
-0.79
(0.50)
-0.27
(0.45)
0.91*
(0.43)

Model 5

Model 6

-0.17
(0.48)
0.05
(0.46)
-0.67
(0.50)
-0.34
(0.38)
0.06
(0.36)
-0.01
(0.11)

-0.24
(0.38)
0.90*
0.06
0.11
0.11
(0.43)
(0.36)
(0.36)
(0.36)
0.00
0.13
0.12
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.12)
0.86**
0.85**
(0.26)
(0.26)
Abortion
0.15
0.16
0.38
0.39
(0.37)
(0.37)
(0.37)
(0.37)
Sex
0.30
0.34
0.27
0.31
(0.36)
(0.36)
(0.36)
(0.36)
Race
-0.11
-0.14
-0.07
-0.10
(0.47)
(0.47)
(0.46)
(0.46)
Age
-1.00*** -1.01*** -0.99*** -1.00***
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.13)
Political
-1.20*** -1.19*** -1.15*** -1.14***
Knowledge
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
Observations
342
342
340
340
340
340
Adjusted R2
0.0283
0.0313
0.3316
0.3318
0.3516
0.3516
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Broadly Targeted Court
Curbing. The models are restricted to conservatives, defined as respondents with self-reported
ideology scores of 5 or more. The coefficient and standard error for Data Control are omitted.

Overall, the evidence for the Coalition Information Hypothesis is mixed: these cues
appear to influence liberal respondents to be more supportive of broadly targeted court curbing
(although the evidence is admittedly tentative), but they do not appear to have much effect on
conservatives. These are important findings. If cues about the composition of the majority
coalition increase support for broadly targeted court curbing among liberals but do not influence
conservatives to be less supportive of such measures, then source cues about the majority
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coalition may lead to increased aggregate support for broadly targeted court curbing because the
increase in support among liberals is not offset by a similar decrease in support among
conservatives.
Turning to the General Policy Disagreement hypothesis, the results are once again
surprising given the current literature on policy disagreement and support for broadly targeted
court curbing. Even in Models 3 and 4, which control for General Policy Disagreement but not
Ideology, General Policy Disagreement does not predict support for broadly targeted court
curbing measures among conservatives. In the full models, Model 5 and Model 6, General Policy
Disagreement is positive signed but not significant. The split sample analysis also does not
support the hypothesis that specific policy disagreement will influence support for broadly
targeted court curbing. However, in Model 5 and Model 6, Ideology is both positive (0.86 and
0.85) and significant (p<0.01), indicating that, among conservatives, respondents who are more
conservative report higher levels of support for broadly targeted court curbing.
These findings appear to stand at odds with the current literature, given the now-standard
view is that policy disagreement is an important predictor of support for broadly targeted court
curbing measures. Among liberals, those who are most liberal are more supportive of broadly
targeted court curbing. And, among conservatives, those who are most conservative are more
supportive of broadly targeted court curbing measures. In other words, support for narrowly
targeted court curbing measures is driven, in large part, by respondents’ ideological polarization.
Respondents who are more polarized report higher levels of support for broadly targeted court
curbing.
These findings merit further attention. Because the data is split between two samples
(liberal and conservatives), the measure Ideology is both a measure of respondent ideology and a
measure of respondent polarization. To disentangle the influence of general policy disagreement,
specific policy disagreement, the individual’s left-right ideology, and the individual’s degree of
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ideological polarization, I create a measures Respondent Polarization, which is the absolute value
of the difference between the respondent’s reported ideology score (from 1 to 7) and the midpoint
of that scale (4). Values for Respondent Polarization range from 0 (for moderates) to 3 (for
extreme liberals and extreme conservatives). Evaluating the influence of these three indicators
simultaneously in a split sample design is not possible because, in each subset of data, Ideology is
perfectly correlated with Respondent Polarization (-1.00 for liberals and 1.00 for conservatives).
To evaluate the influence of left-right ideology and respondent polarization simultaneously, I
recalculate Model 5 from Table 4.4, but include all respondents.
The results, reported in Table 4.5 show strong evidence that, when evaluating the
influence of an individual’s general policy disagreement, specific policy disagreement, left-right
ideology, and degree of ideological polarization (or distance from the midpoint of the scale)—one
factor is far more important than the others. And that factor is the individual respondent’s
polarization.
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Broadly Targeted Court
Curbing (All Respondents)
Model 1

Beta

Republican

0.20
0.02
(0.24)
Federalist S.
0.38
0.05
(0.24)
Both Cues
0.00
0.00
(0.24)
Federalist S. Information
0.03
0.00
(0.18)
Policy Disagreement
0.11
0.07
(0.06)
Ideology
-0.12
-0.07
(0.07)
Respondent Polarization
0.68***
0.19
(0.09)
Abortion
0.45*
0.07
(0.20)
Sex
0.44*
0.07
(0.18)
Race
-0.13
-0.01
(0.24)
Age
-0.61***
-0.24
(0.07)
Political Knowledge
-0.87***
-0.30
(0.08)
Observations
1060
Adjusted R2
0.2822
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Broadly Targeted Court
Curbing. The model includes all respondents without missing data. The coefficient and standard
error for Data Control are omitted.

The coefficient for Respondent Polarization is both large (0.68) and significant
(p<0.001). The beta weights indicate that a one standard deviation change in individual
polarization predicts a 0.19 standard deviation increase in support for broadly targeted court
curbing. Coefficients for General Policy Disagreement and Abortion are both positively signed,
as expected, although the beta weights are much smaller (0.07 for each). And although Abortion
is statistically significant at traditional thresholds, General Policy Disagreement falls just short
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(although p<0.10). Ideology is negatively signed, indicating that conservatives may be somewhat
less likely to support broadly targeted court curbing than are liberals. However, Ideology falls just
short of traditional significance thresholds (p<0.10). Although these results support the view that
policy disagreement influences support for broadly targeted court curbing, they also reveal that
respondent polarization is a stronger influence than either of those factors.
One final note is required here. Although respondent polarization appears to be the most
important ideological influence on an individual’s support for broadly targeted court curbing, an
individual’s age and political knowledge appear to be even larger influences on support for
broadly targeted court curbing. Respondents who are older are much likely to support broadly
targeted court curbing measures than are younger individuals, and those with higher levels of
political knowledge are also less likely to support broadly targeted court curbing.
Narrowly Targeted Court Curbing
Models predicting support for narrowly targeted court curbing among liberals are
reported in Table 4.6. For liberals, I expected that the Coalition Information cues in which the
expected majority coalition is associated with Republicans, the Federalist Society, or both would
increase liberals’ support for narrowly targeted court curbing. However, the results are only
significant in one condition—the Federalist Society cue—and even then, it’s in the opposite
direction from what was expected.
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Narrowly Targeted Court
Curbing (Liberals)
Model 1
Republican
Federalist S.
Both Cues
All Cues
(Collapsed)
Federalist S.
Information
Policy
Disagreement
Ideology

Model 2

-0.22
(0.29)
-1.00**
(0.30)
-0.00
(0.29)

Model 3

Model 4

-0.20
(0.26)
-0.79**
(0.28)
0.11
(0.27)
-0.38
(0.23)
-0.13
(0.22)

Model 5

Model 6

-0.18
(0.26)
-0.76**
(0.28)
0.11
(0.27)
-0.28
(0.21)
-0.05
(0.20)
0.51***
(0.06)

-0.25
(0.21)
-0.09
-0.01
-0.00
-0.03
(0.22)
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.20)
0.51***
0.56*** 0.56***
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.07)
0.26
0.29
(0.15)
(0.15)
Abortion
1.32*** 1.35*** 1.28*** 1.30***
(0.24)
(0.24)
(0.24)
(0.24)
Sex
0.86*** 0.83*** 0.85*** 0.83***
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.19)
(0.20)
Race
0.13
0.17
0.12
0.16
(0.27)
(0.28)
(0.27)
(0.28)
Age
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.07
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Political
-0.22*
-0.25**
-0.22*
-0.25**
Knowledge
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Observations
583
583
576
576
576
576
Adjusted R2
0.3324
0.3230
0.4565
0.4494
0.4583
0.4518
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Narrowly Targeted Court
Curbing. The models are restricted to liberals, defined as respondents with self-reported ideology
scores of 3 or less. The coefficient and standard error for Data Control are omitted.

I expected that liberals who received the Federalist Society Information condition—in
which respondents were told that there are Federalist Society members on the Supreme Court and
that these justices had conservatively 90% of the time in cases involving abortion—would report
higher levels of support for narrowly targeted court curbing measures concerning the issue of
abortion. The results do not bear this out, as the Federalist Society Information condition is not a
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significant predictor of liberals’ support for narrowly targeted court curbing measures under any
of the reported model specifications.
I also expected higher levels of general and specific policy disagreement to predict higher
levels of support for broadly targeted court curbing measures. The results indicate that this is true.
General Policy Disagreement and Abortion are statistically and substantively significant across
all four models in which they are included. These results support the General Disagreement
Hypothesis for narrowly targeted court curbing.
Although the Models in Table 4.3 suggested that respondent ideology or polarization
plays a major role in shaping support for broadly targeted court curbing among liberals, that does
not appear to be the case for narrowly targeted court curbing—at least, not in the split-sample
analysis. It may be the case that left-right ideology and respondent polarization have either no
role or merely very small roles in influencing support for narrowly targeted court curbing
measures. Alternatively, it might be the case that both play roles but that they influence support in
opposite directions. Additional analysis after the models predicting support for narrowly targeted
court curbing among conservatives will provide clarity about which of these possibilities is true.
Table 4.7 reports models predicting conservatives’ support for narrowly targeted court
curbing measures. The vignette conditions are not significant across any of the reported model
specifications, although the coefficient for Federalist Society Information is consistently negative,
as expected. Remarkably, for conservatives, the coefficient for General Policy Disagreement is
negative across all four models in which it is included. The two models that control for
respondent ideology make it clear that the respondent’s left-right ideology, degree of polarization,
or both play important roles in shaping support for narrowly targeted court curbing. Those models
indicate that, among conservatives, those who are most conservative are least likely to support
narrowly targeted court curbing measures.
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Table 4.7: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Narrowly Targeted Court
Curbing (Conservatives)
Model 1
Republican
Federalist S.
Both Cues
All Cues
(Collapsed)
Federalist S.
Information
Policy
Disagreement
Ideology

Model 2

0.21
(0.36)
0.12
(0.34)
-0.29
(0.37)

Model 3

Model 4

0.22
(0.36)
0.21
(0.34)
-0.16
(0.37)
0.02
(0.28)
-0.25
(0.26)

Model 5

Model 6

0.23
(0.35)
0.05
(0.33)
-0.26
(0.36)
0.11
(0.28)
-0.31
(0.27)
-0.09
(0.08)

0.02
(0.27)
-0.25
-0.31
-0.36
-0.35
(0.26)
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.26)
-0.09
-0.20*
-0.20*
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.08)
-0.75*** -0.73***
(0.19)
(0.18)
Abortion
0.65*
0.66*
0.45
0.46
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.27)
Sex
0.12
0.14
0.15
0.17
(0.27)
(0.26)
(0.26)
(0.26)
Race
0.64
0.62
0.60
0.59
(0.34)
(0.34)
(0.34)
(0.34)
Age
-0.12
-0.13
-0.13
-0.14
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Political
-0.02
-0.02
-0.06
-0.06
Knowledge
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
Observations
342
342
340
340
340
340
Adjusted R2
0.0073
0.0078
0.0282
0.0306
0.0708
0.0719
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Narrowly Targeted Court
Curbing. The models are restricted to conservatives, defined as respondents with self-reported
ideology scores of 5 or more. The coefficient and standard error for Data Control are omitted.

The results here are interesting, both because they are at odds with the results for liberals
and because the effect of General Policy Disagreement appears to be the opposite of what was
expected here. Whereas the aggregate effects of left-right ideology and polarization fell short of
significance in the sample of liberals, the aggregate effects of those factors in the conservative
sample are strongly significant, with more conservative respondents being especially unlikely to
support narrowly targeted court curbing. Model 3 and Model 4 support the Specific
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Disagreement Hypothesis, although Abortion falls just short of statistical significance in the full
models that include ideology.
As was the case when evaluating support broadly targeted court curbing measures, a full
model that includes both liberals and conservatives will help clarify how an individual’s general
policy disagreement, specific policy disagreement, left-right ideology, and degree of ideological
polarization shape support for narrowly targeted court curbing.
Table 4.8 reports results for the full sample. In this model, a respondent’s general policy
disagreement with the Court, specific policy disagreement on the issue of abortion, left-right
ideology, and degree of ideological polarization all influence support for narrowly targeted court
curbing measures. However, the dynamics are somewhat different for narrowly targeted court
curbing than they are for broadly targeted court curbing.
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Table 4.8: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Narrowly Targeted Court
Curbing (All Respondents)
Model 1

Beta

Republican

0.01
0.00
(0.21)
Federalist S.
-0.24
-0.03
(0.21)
Both Cues
-0.00
-0.00
(0.21)
Federalist S. Information
-0.25
-0.04
(0.15)
Policy Disagreement
0.39**
0.29
(0.05)
Ideology
-0.21***
-0.13
(0.06)
Respondent Polarization
-0.35***
-0.11
(0.08)
Abortion
1.23***
0.21
(0.17)
Sex
0.51**
0.08
(0.15)
Race
0.25
0.03
(0.20)
Age
-0.03
-0.01
(0.06)
Political Knowledge
-0.11
-0.04
(0.07)
Observations
1059
Adjusted R2
0.3248
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Narrowly Targeted Court
Curbing. The model includes all respondents without missing data. The coefficient and standard
error for Data Control are omitted.

Whereas respondents reporting high levels of ideological polarization were more likely to
support broadly targeted court curbing, they are less likely to support narrowly targeted court
curbing. And whereas the strongest ideological influence predicting support for broadly targeted
court curbing is respondent polarization, that is not the case for narrowly targeted court curbing.
The beta weights indicate that General Policy Disagreement (0.29) and Abortion (0.21) are the
two ideological factors with the greatest influence on support for narrowly targeted court curbing
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measures. These results largely reflect the Johnston and Bartels (2020) assessment of the role of
policy disagreement in shaping support for court curbing.
As was the case for broadly targeted court curbing, those who are more conservative
appear to be less likely to support narrowly targeted court curbing. I hesitate, however, to
conclude that liberals are more likely to support both forms of court curbing than are
conservatives. It may simply be the case that liberals are more likely to support broadly and
narrowly targeted court curbing measures when the Court issues a salient conservative decision,
and that we would observe th4.e opposite relationship if the Court issued a liberal decision.
The results in Table 4.8 also provide insight into why Ideology was significant in the
models predicting conservative support for narrowly targeted court curbing, but not in the models
predicting liberal support. While the forces of left-right ideology and respondent polarization both
reduce support for narrowly targeted court curbing among conservatives, the effects of left-right
ideology and polarization largely counteract each other in terms of their influence on support for
narrowly targeted court curbing among liberals.
The additional analyses in this study predicting support for broadly and narrowly targeted
court curbing measures across the full sample provide important insights about the ideological
forces that influence support for court curbing. The model predicting support for narrowly
targeted court curbing largely reflects the Bartels and Johnston (2020) view that the most
important ideological factors driving support for court curbing are general and specific policy
disagreement. But the results reveal that at least two other ideological factors are important:
individuals who are more conservative are less likely to support narrowly targeted court curbing
measures, and individuals who with high degrees of ideological polarization—whether liberal or
conservative—are less likely to support narrowly targeted court curbing.
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Most critically, these results upend the prevailing view concerning the ideological forces
that shape support for broadly targeted court curbing measures. Not only does ideological
polarization matter, but it seems to be an even stronger influence than general policy
disagreement on support for broadly targeted court curbing measures, as both very liberal and
very conservative individuals are more likely than moderates to support broadly targeted court
curbing.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study leverages a survey experiment to evaluate whether cues about the composition
of an upcoming Supreme Court decision influence respondents’ support for broadly targeted and
narrowly targeted court curbing measures, and whether informational cues about the voting
behavior of justices associated with the Federalist Society in abortion cases influence support for
narrowly targeted court curbing measures. The survey experiment used vignettes based on the
case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health. This was a particularly difficult test for the influence of
source cues, as the survey experiment involved an exceptionally salient case and was conducted
after a draft of the majority opinion had been leaked to the public and made national news.
Nonetheless, I expected that cues about the expected majority coalition in the case of Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health would influence respondents’ support for both broadly and narrowly
targeted court curbing measures. Specifically, the expectation was that these cues would make
liberals more supportive of both types of court curbing measures, and to make conservative less
supportive of both. I also expected that informational cues indicating that justices of the Supreme
Court who are associated with the Federalist Society have voted very conservatively on abortion
cases would increase liberal support for narrowly targeted court curbing, and to have the opposite
effect on conservatives.
The results here are mixed. For liberals, there is tentative support for the hypothesis that
cues associating justices expected to form the majority coalition with Republicans, the Federalist
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Society, or both will increase support for broadly targeted court curbing measures, but these cues
do not positively influence support for narrowly targeted court curbing. For conservatives, these
cues do not appear to influence support for either broadly targeted or narrowly targeted forms of
court curbing. Cues providing information about the especially conservative voting behavior of
justices associated with the Federalist Society in abortion cases did not significantly influence
respondents’ support for narrowly targeted court curbing, although the coefficients were
consistently signed in the expected direction.
While only one of these expectations was largely supported—liberals are more likely to
support broadly targeted court curbing when they receive a cue indicating that the majority
coalition in a case consists of Republicans, Federalist Society members, or both—that fact itself
has implications for the Court. Media coverage of Supreme Court cases decided along ideological
lines, especially if that coverage invokes a Federalist Society cue, may increase support for
broadly targeted court curbing among liberals without dampening support for broadly targeted
court curbing among conservatives. In the aggregate, this may lead to more support for broadly
targeted court curbing over time.
In additional analysis of the relationship between policy disagreement and support for
court curbing, I also uncovered some interesting dynamics concerning the ideological factors that
influence support for court curbing. Bartels and Johnston (2020) reoriented the literature on
Supreme Court legitimacy by showing that general and specific policy disagreement shape
individuals’ support for both broadly and narrowly targeted court curbing measures. While the
analyses in this study reaffirm that general and specific policy disagreement influence support for
court curbing, they also indicate that researchers evaluating individual support for court curbing
must consider the important role played by ideological polarization.
The results indicate that ideological polarization is the most important ideological factor
driving support for broadly targeted court curbing, as individuals at both the liberal and the
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conservative extremes are more likely to support broadly targeted court curbing than are
moderates. This result is particularly important because it reveals both that ideological
polarization influences support for court courting and that there may be more support for broadly
targeted court curbing among conservatives than the prevailing wisdom would expect. While an
individual’s degree of ideological polarization also influences support for narrowly targeted court
curbing, it has the opposite effect (and a weaker one as well), as more ideologically extreme
respondents appear to be less likely to support narrowly targeted court curbing measures.
There is also some evidence that liberals are more supportive of both broadly targeted
and narrowly targeted court curbing than are conservatives, but I refrain from advocating that
conclusion. It could simply be the case that liberals were more supportive of court curbing than
were conservatives because respondents anticipated a conservative decision. Perhaps, if
respondents had expected a liberal decision, then the relationship between left-right ideology and
court curbing would be reversed. Future research should evaluate whether it truly is the case that
liberals are generally more supportive of both broadly and targeted court curbing measures, or
whether the results found here are a consequence of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health being a
highly salient case for which individuals anticipated a conservative decision.
This study contributes to the nascent literature on the Federalist Society and to a larger
literature on source cues by showing that cues associating the majority coalition in a decision
with Republicans, the Federalist Society, or both may increase support for broadly targeted court
curbing among liberals, but not conservatives. It also contributes to the growing body of research
suggesting that ideological factors do influence individuals’ support for the Court. Bartels and
Johnston (2013; 2020) reoriented the literature on support for the Supreme Court by showing that
policy disagreement is an important factor influencing individuals’ support for both broadly
targeted and narrowly targeted court curbing. This study adds important nuance to our
understanding of the ideological factors that influence individual support for the Court, showing
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not only that ideological polarization is an important factor, but also that it is the most important
ideological factor driving an individual’s support for broadly targeted court curbing.
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Chapter Five:
Conclusion
Since its creation in law schools four decades ago, the Federalist Society has come to
play a dominant role in the United States’ legal system. The network has chapters at every
accredited law school in the United States, and these chapters are the lifeblood of the Federalist
Society. Student chapters play an important role in the socialization of conservative attorneys.
While the network does not take official policy positions, its members have played an active role
in shaping law in the United States as litigants, attorneys, amicus curiae, law clerks, judges, and
even as justices of the Supreme Court. From these positions within the legal system, Federalist
Society members have achieved dramatic policy victories for conservatives in a variety of areas
of law—most notably, on controversial landmark Supreme Court cases involving the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (Shelby County v. Holder), campaign spending (Citizens United v. FEC),
affirmative action (Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action), religion (Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue) and, most recently, abortion (Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health). Despite the magnitude of these policy victories for the Federalist Society network,
perhaps even more significant is the network’s success at promoting its members to positions in
the United States judicial system. The Federalist Society, which can claim six of the nine
Supreme Court justices as members, has a dominant position on the highest court in the United
States both now and for the foreseeable future.
The studies here tell us much about the power of the Federalist Society. The central
questions I ask are: Where does the Federalist Society’s power come from? How does its
influence manifest in Supreme Court decision-making? And, given the Federalist Society’s
dominant role on the Supreme Court, how can we expect it to influence public support for the
Court?
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The second chapter of this dissertation examines law schools’ Federalist Society student
chapters and reveals that the organizational strength of the network, at the grassroots level, is
associated with the presence of conservative law students and the presence of highly efficacious
and successful law students. At the elite level, chapter strength is associated with the presence of
conservative law professors and the presence of highly efficacious and successful law professors.
The ideological grievances of conservative law professors—both with respect to the average law
professor and the average alum at a law school—also influences chapter strength: When a law
school’s conservative professors are more ideologically distant from that law school’s average
professor or average alum, Federalist Society chapters are stronger.
In the third chapter, I draw from the literature on group polarization, which is a wellknown topic in social psychology and political psychology. I hypothesize that Federalist Society
members should be expected to vote especially conservatively when a case concerns a “core
policy issue.” Drawing from biographical narratives about the Federalist Society and its place in
the conservative legal movement and extant quantitative research on the Federalist Society, I
identify eight policy issues on which justices from the Federalist Society should be expected to
vote especially conservatively: abortion, affirmative action, campaign spending, desegregation,
religion, searches and seizures, sex discrimination, and the Voting Right Act of 1965. The results
indicate that on these issues do vote more conservatively than their peers on these core policy
issues. I also examine whether the especially conservative voting behavior of Federalist Society
members on the Supreme Court can be attributed to higher levels of support for states’ rights
when compared to other Republican-nominated justices. The results suggest that Federalist
Society members do not prioritize states’ rights more than do other Republican-nominated
justices. On the contrary, when a pro-state vote requires a liberal vote, Federalist Society
members are less likely than their Republican-nominated peers to cast pro-state votes. In other
words, when justices’ preferences for states’ rights and casting conservative votes collide such
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that they cannot simultaneously vote in favor of states’ rights and cast conservative votes,
Federalist Society members are particularly likely to prioritize casting conservative votes over
casting votes that support states’ rights. These findings have implications for future case
outcomes and for the ongoing debate over whether judges associated with the Federalist Society
are different from other Republican judges because they are more principled or because they are
more conservative. These findings also have implications for public support for the Supreme
Court and public perceptions of judicial legitimacy, as Federalist Society members’ prioritization
of conservative policy outcomes over legal principle could undermine support the Court and the
legal system, particularly among liberals.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation turns to the question of the influence of the
Federalist Society on public support for the Supreme Court. Historically, the Court has been
viewed as enjoying a reservoir of good will from the public, which is the source of its power—if
the Supreme Court didn’t enjoy high levels of support, politicians and other implementers would
be less likely to adhere to its decisions. However, recent research undermines this view,
suggesting that an individual’s support for the Court is strongly influenced by whether the Court
is perceived as being ideologically close to or distant from that individual. Building from this
recent research, I argue that the way in which articles frame information about the Court can
shape respondents’ support for the Court by serving as a partisan cue. Employing an MTurk
survey experiment, conducted in June 2022, I test several hypotheses concerning how Federalist
Society membership might act as a partisan cue. When an article describes the expected majority
coalition as consisting of Federalist Society members without clarifying that they are also
Republican-nominated or providing additional information about the Federalist Society, only
highly knowledgeable respondents—who know that the Federalist Society is conservative—will
be influenced by the informational frame. Among these high-knowledge respondents, liberals will
report lower support for the Court (and higher support for court curbing measures) while
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conservatives will report higher support for the Court (and lower support for court curbing
measures). However, when the majority coalition is describe as being composed of Republicannominated justices or Republican-nominated justices who are also members of the Federalist
Society, a stronger partisan cue is sent, and less politically knowledgeable respondents will also
be influenced by the cue. Moreover, when articles provide additional information about the
voting behavior of Supreme Court justices from the Federalist Society, the effects of these
partisan cue will increase, leading to especially low support for the Court among liberals and
especially high support for the Court among conservatives. These results are normatively
concerning for the Court because they indicate that the more factual information provided about
the Federalist Society in a news article, the less support the Court will have among liberals. Prior
to 2017, few Americans had heard of the Federalist Society. But in the current era in which the
Federalist Society now holds a dominant position on the Supreme Court, we should expect
Americans to gradually become more aware of the Federalist Society through news reporting. As
Americans become more aware of the Federalist Society and its influence, we might expect an
erosion in support for the Court among liberals and increased calls for court curbing.
This dissertation, in its entirety, examines the Federalist Society in three areas—in law
schools, on the Supreme Court, and in the public mind, and makes important inroad in terms of
our understanding of where the Federalist Society’s organizational strength comes from, how
judges from the Federalist Society behave differently from the more traditional Republicannominated justices who no longer are present on the Court, and how the Federalist Society might
influence public support (or lack of public support) for the Court. While the Federalist Society
has been under-studied in political science, its influence cannot be understated. In the summer
during which this dissertation was completed, the Supreme Court issued a series of salient and
divisive opinions on cases pertaining to some of the policy issues highlighted in this dissertation
as particularly important to Federalist Society members. Most notable among these was Dobbs v.
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Jackson Women’s Health, a landmark case in which the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade
and dramatically changed the law in the United States overnight. Although this dissertation makes
numerous important contributions to our understanding of the Federalist Society, there is more
yet to learn. In future work, I aim to delve further still into this new and important research
agenda.
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Appendix A

Table A1: KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy for Chapter Strength components

Variable

KMO

Total Officers

0.8692

Total Followers

0.8125

Total Events

0.8669

Student Chapter Award Total

0.8205

Story Award Total

0.8623

Platforms

0.8227

Overall

0.8406

Table A1 reports the KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy for the six indicators of Chapter
Strength. All six indicators surpass the 0.60 threshold suggested by (Howard 2016).
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Table A2: Factors and Eigenvalues of Iterated Principal-Factor Analysis for Chapter
Strength with Orthogonal Quartimin Rotation

Factor

Eigenvalue

Factor 1

2.98554

Factor 2

0.30096

Factor 3

0.29860

Factor 4

0.14271

Factor 5

0.00370

Iterated principal-factor analysis reveals that the six indicators used to generate Chapter Strength
have one latent factor.
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Table A3: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients for Indicators Related to Capacity for Student
Organization Development

Law School
Orgs
Law School
Orgs
Journals
Full-Time
Enrollment
Professors
Library

Journals

Full-Time
Enrollment

Professors

Library

1.0000
0.6266

1.0000

0.7081

0.7491

1.0000

0.6572

0.7676

0.8878

1.0000

0.4773

0.5723

0.5908

0.5682
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1.0000

Table A4: KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy for Entrance Scores components

Variable

KMO

GPALow

0.8586

GPAMedian

0.7549

GPAHigh

0.8284

LSATLow

0.8410

LSATMedian

0.7694

LSATHigh

0.8477

Overall

0.8138

Authors should seek KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy above .60 prior to performing factor
analysis (Howard 2016).
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Table A5: Factors and Eigenvalues of Iterated Principal-Factor Analysis for Entrance
Scores with Orthogonal Quartimin Rotation

Factor

Eigenvalue

Factor 1

5.29251

Factor 2

0.45221

Factor 3

0.07475

Factor 4

0.01084

Factor 5

0.00078

Factor 6

-0.00019

Iterated principal-factor analysis reveals that the six indicators used to generate EntranceScores
have one latent factor.
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Table A6: Factor Loadings on Factor 1 (Entrance Scores)
Variable

Factor 1

GPALow

0.9349

GPAMedian

0.9378

GPAHigh

0.8682

LSATLow

0.9030

LSATMedian

0.9701

LSATHigh

0.9616

Table A6 reports Factor Loadings for the six indicators used to generate EntranceScores.
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Table A7: KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy for Resources components

Variable

KMO

Professors

0.7930

Library

0.9458

Full-Time Enrollment

0.7900

Journals

0.9116

Law School Orgs

0.9279

Overall

0.8558

Authors should seek KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy above .60 prior to performing factor
analysis (Howard 2016).
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Table A8: Factors and Eigenvalues of Iterated Principal-Factor Analysis for Resources with
Orthogonal Quartimin Rotation

Factor

Eigenvalue

Factor 1

3.37459

Factor 2

0.06612

Factor 3

0.01537

Factor 4

-0.01943

Factor 5

-0.06207

Iterated principal-factor analysis reveals that the six indicators used to generate Resources have
one latent factor.
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Table A9: Factor Loadings on Factor 1 (Resources)
Variable

Factor 1

Professors

0.9170

Library

0.6433

Full-Time Enrollment

0.9367

Journals

0.8344

Law School Orgs

0.7390

Table A9 reports Factor Loadings for the six indicators used to generate Resources.
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Figure A1: Visual Scree Plot (VSP) Analysis for Entrance Scores components
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Figure A2: Visual Scree Plot (VSP) Analysis for Resources components
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Appendix B
Section 1
Identifying Core Issues for the Federalist Society
To identify core policy issues for the Federalist Society, I use Avery and McLaughlin
(2013) as a starting point. They note that Leonard Leo—the co-chairman and former Executive
Vice President of the Federalist Society—has signaled clear opposition to Roe v. Wade. And
because Teles (2008) notes that conservative Christians constitute a major faction of the
Federalist Society, I identify abortion policy as a major issue to the Federalist Society. Other
policy issues identified by Avery and McLaughlin (2013) that Federalist Society members appear
to be deeply involved as attorneys and advocates include opposition to affirmative action (pp.
110), opposition to restrictions on campaign spending (pp. 146), opposition to desegregation
cases (pp. 105), opposition to sex discrimination claims (pp. 118), and support for conservative
Christian views (pp. 144). Based on their work, I categorize each of these as issues that are
important to the Federalist Society.
Next, based on the results from Scherer and Miller (2009), I include cases involving
searches and seizures as a Core Issue. However, I do not include states’ rights in the construction
of Core Issue for two reasons: first, 19.98% of all votes cast in my dataset involve cases in which
one party is a state, while cases involving all the other core policy issues discussed below account
for 10.48% of votes in the dataset. Thus, including all cases in which one party is a state could
lead to results driven primarily by justices’ behavior on cases involving states. Second, to
evaluate H2 (that Federalist Society members vote more conservatively in cases in which one
party is a state), I must model the influence of state involvement in a case separately from other
policy issues.
While Avery and McLaughlin (2013) provide the most comprehensive review of the
ways in which key Federalist Society members have been involved in advocating conservative
policy positions, there are other sources of insight into the policy issues that are important to
Federalist Society members. I also included issues that exhibited significant amicus activity, such
as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was the focus of Shelby County v. Holder (2013). In that
case, seven amicus briefs were filed in support of Shelby County, Alabama, which challenged the
constitutionality of the Act. Of the seven amicus briefs filed in support of Shelby County, four
were authored or co-authored by members of the Federalist Society, and these four amicus briefs
included seven authors who were Federalist Society members—all of whom have also been
active as speakers at Federalist Society events around the country.
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Section 2
Table B1: Coding scheme for Core Issue and State Involvement

Issue

SCDB Coding

Core Issue: Abortion

issue = 50020

Core Issue: Affirmative Action

issue = 20070

Core Issue: Campaign Spending

issue = 30140

Core Issue: Desegregation

issue = 20040; 20050

Core Issue: Religious

issue = 30170; 30180

Core Issue: Sex discrimination

issue = 20130; 20140

Core Issue: Searches and Seizures

issue = 10050; 10060; 10070

Core Issue: Voting Rights Act of 1965

issue = 20020

State Involvement

petitioner =28 and/or respondent = 28
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Figure B1: Marginal Effect of Federalist Society Membership on Voting Behavior Based on
Issue and State Involvement (Model 3)

Figure B1 graphs the average marginal effect of Federalist Society membership on conservative
voting based on whether a case involves a Core Issue (left panel) and based on whether a state is
involved in a case (right panel). These results are based on the results from Model 3 in Table 3.2.
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Figure B2: Marginal Effect of Federalist Society Membership on Voting for Petitioner
Based on State Role in Case and LC Decision Direction

Figure B2 graphs the average marginal effect of Federalist Society membership on a justice’s
propensity to vote in favor of the petitioner based on whether the state is the petitioner or the
respondent and whether the lower court decision was liberal or conservative. These results are
based on Model 3 in Table 3.3.
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Appendix C
Table C1: T-Test Difference in Means, Reported Federalist Society Ideology
Observations

Mean

General Information

474

4.44

Federalist Society Information

598

4.66

Difference
(p-value)

-0.22
(0.07)
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Table C2: Cross-Tabulations of Responses Describing Expected Majority Coalition in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health

Coalition
Information
Moderate,
Libertarian, &
Conservative

Manipulation Check Response: Majority Coalition description
Liberal and
Liberal American
Moderate,
Conservative
American
Constitution Libertarian,
Constitution
Society
and
Society
Conservative
14
27
14
99
33
1.47
2.84
1.47
10.42
3.47

Conservative
and
Federalist
Society
20
2.11

Federalist
Society

Total

32
3.37

239
25.16
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Republican

24
2.53

22
2.32

32
3.37

28
2.95

70
7.37

34
3.58

22
2.32

232
24.42

Federalist Society

15
1.58

30
3.16

25
2.63

24
2.53

19
2.00

37
3.89

90
9.47

240
25.26

Republican and
Federalist Society

18
1.89

18
1.89

29
3.05

18
1.89

37
3.89

87
9.16

32
3.37

239
25.16

Total

71
7.47

97
10.21

100
10.53

169
17.79

159
16.74

178
18.74

176
18.53

950
100.0
0

First row has frequencies, and second row has cell percentages.

Table C3: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Broadly Targeted Court Curbing
(Liberals)

Model 1
All Cues
(Collapsed)
Federalist S.
Information
Policy
Disagreement
Ideology

Model 2

Model 3

0.42
(0.23)
-0.04
(0.22)
0.07
(0.08)
-0.94***
(0.17)
0.34
(0.26)
0.53*
(0.21)
-0.27
(0.30)
-0.40***
(0.09)
-0.67***
(0.10)
Controlled

Model 4

Model 5

0.31
0.26
0.57
0.48
(0.23)
(0.26)
(0.39)
(0.40)
-0.09
-0.03
-0.02
-0.02
(0.22)
(0.24)
(0.35)
(0.37)
-0.13*
-0.07
0.28*
0.35*
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.11)
(0.12)
-1.16***
-1.08***
-0.63*
-0.53
(0.16)
(0.18)
(0.28)
(0.28)
Abortion
0.08
0.06
0.33
0.25
(0.26)
(0.29)
(0.51)
(0.54)
Sex
0.48*
0.46
0.72*
0.57
(0.22)
(0.24)
(0.35)
(0.36)
Race
-0.31
-0.29
-0.30
-0.33
(0.31)
(0.34)
(0.46)
(0.48)
Age
-0.43***
-0.43***
-0.43**
-0.41**
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.14)
Political
-0.72***
-0.74***
-1.00***
-1.07***
Knowledge
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.17)
(0.17)
Data Control
Not
Dropped
Dropped
controlled
Attention
Controlled
Not
Dropped
Dropped
Control
controlled
Observations
577
577
504
294
275
Adjusted R2
0.2441
0.2181
0.2045
0.2001
0.2057
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Broadly Targeted Court Curbing. The
models are restricted to liberals, defined as respondents with self-reported ideology scores of 3 or less.
Data Control accounts for respondents who reported believing the Federalist Society to be liberal.
Attention Control accounts for respondent who incorrectly responded to attention check questions or took
over 15,000 second to complete the survey experiment.
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Table C4: OLS Regression Models Predicting Support for Broadly Targeted Court Curbing
(Conservatives)

All Cues
(Collapsed)
Federalist S.
Information
Policy
Disagreement
Ideology
Abortion
Sex
Race
Age
Political
Knowledge
Data Control
Attention
Control
Observations
Adjusted R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-0.24
(0.38)
0.11
(0.36)
0.12
(0.11)
0.85**
(0.26)
0.39
(0.37)
0.31
(0.36)
-0.11
(0.47)
-1.00***
(0.13)
-1.14***
(0.15)
Controlled

-0.21
(0.38)
-0.08
(0.36)
0.08
(0.11)
0.78**
(0.25)
0.36
(0.37)
0.39
(0.36)
-0.13
(0.47)
-1.03***
(0.13)
-1.17***
(0.15)
Not
controlled
Not
controlled
340
0.3453

-0.25
(0.40)
0.22
(0.38)
0.17
(0.12)
0.92**
(0.27)
0.38
(0.39)
0.45
(0.38)
-0.24
(0.49)
-1.09***
(0.14)
-1.12***
(0.16)

0.00
(0.40)
0.04
(0.39)
0.17
(0.13)
0.84**
(0.28)
0.20
(0.40)
0.34
(0.39)
-0.22
(0.50)
-0.97***
(0.14)
-1.27***
(0.16)
Dropped

0.01
(0.43)
0/17
(0.41)
0.27*
(0.14)
0.99**
(0.29)
0.24
(0.42)
0.41
(0.40)
-0.36
(0.52)
-1.03***
(0.14)
-1.23***
(0.17)
Dropped

Controlled
340
0.3497

Dropped
308
0.3618

Dropped
297
0.3637

269
0.3905

*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Entries represent OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. Dependent variable is the respondent’s support for Broadly Targeted Court Curbing. The
models are restricted to conservatives, defined as respondents with self-reported ideology scores of 5 or
more. Data Control accounts for respondents who reported believing the Federalist Society to be liberal.
Attention Control accounts for respondent who incorrectly responded to attention check questions or took
over 15,000 second to complete the survey experiment.
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